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THESIS ABSTRACT 
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Title: Livelihood Strategies in China: Lessons Learned From Taiyuan 
 
 
Studies of urban China often deploy top-down analyses and focus on tier-1 cities 
such as Beijing and Shanghai. This thesis contributes to a diversifying literature by using 
a bottom-up analysis to compare the livelihood strategies of peri-urban residents in 
Taiyuan, a tier-2 city, to those in tier-1 and other lower-tiered cities. The empirical 
findings elucidate a similar spectrum of livelihood strategies, but unlike tier-1 and some 
lower-tiered cities, there was an absence of renting to migrant workers in peri-urban 
Taiyuan. Additionally, social infrastructure, social reproduction, and socio-spatial 
practices, often overlooked in studies of Chinese livelihoods, are central to understanding 
livelihood strategies people in peri-urban Taiyuan. Lastly, this thesis suggests that similar 
comparative studies can produce sharper insights into how processes of urbanization are 
not bound to specific territories: Chinese and global urban studies are connected through 
analogous urbanization processes, while also having unique circumstances. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 In order to understand the livelihoods of urban residents in China, it is important 
to analyze how people and communities make certain economic and social decisions to 
improve their lives. The resulting livelihood strategies are intimately linked with 
urbanization processes that are changing individuals’ political-economic and socio-spatial 
circumstances. Chinese urban studies research published in English has often focused on 
tier-1 and coastal cities that are well-known in the West as hubs of economic growth: 
Guangzhou, Nanjing, Chongqing, Beijing, Shenzhen, and Shanghai. But China’s central 
government introduced the National New-type Urbanization Plan in 2014, which is 
designed in part to shift migration and urbanization to lower-tiered cities (Li et al., 2016). 
Chinese urban studies researchers must adapt in response to the central government’s 
goal of urbanizing lower-tiered cities but have done so minimally. Therefore, to address 
this limitation, I conducted field work in Taiyuan, a tier-2 city. Specifically, I sought to 
discover (1) what the livelihood strategies of peri-urban residents in Taiyuan are, as well 
as (2) how those strategies compare to those in prominent Chinese cities.  
Peri-urban spaces are the focal point in this thesis because both the transformation 
of infrastructure and buildings and the effects of urbanization on small communities and 
individuals are more visible than in urban centers. Peri-urban space is not purely defined 
by its spatial proximity to urban centers. Rather, it can be defined as the following:  
All rural residents are simultaneously subject to certain urban institutions, such as 
the commodities market or the state administrative hierarchy, and excluded from 
others, such as the land market or state-sponsored welfare. This peri-urban 
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condition produces substantial precarity, but also forms the basis of residents’ 
strategies for ensuring stability and security. (Smith, 2014, p. 373) 
As such, peri-urban spaces are where people live within a blend of urban and rural 
institutions. As a result of this definition, villages, spaces on the outskirts of cities, and 
urban villages can all be considered peri-urban spaces in China: their economy, land 
rights, citizenship designation, and/or culture create a blend of urban and rural norms.  
As a researcher, I saw the changing landscape, which reflected Jinyuan’s old and 
new economy. The changing landscape helped me to contextualize the livelihood 
strategies described to me in my interviews. Jinyuan is a peri-urban district in Taiyuan. In 
this thesis, I subsumed livelihood strategies into three broad categories: (1) formal 
economic activities, (2) informal economic activities, and (3) social infrastructure, social 
reproduction, and socio-spatial practices. This categorization does not conform to 
previous germane work (Bebbington, 1999; Scoones, 1998; Tian et al., 2016). It 
possesses, however, similar aspects of that extant research by considering what resources 
(natural, financial, human, social, cultural) are available for people to use to improve 
their lives and what strategies people employ that utilize these resources (Scoones, 1998; 
Bebbington, 1999).  
  Drawing on empirical data derived from my research, this thesis will augment 
understanding of the relationship between urbanization processes and livelihood 
strategies in two ways. First, as mentioned before, relative to burgeoning and large urban 
areas, lower-tiered and inland cities have received less attention in Chinese urban studies. 
Understanding the relationship between urbanization and people’s livelihood strategies in 
under-researched, less urbanized parts of China may problematize normative framings of 
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Chinese urban studies. Second, my research emphasizes features of livelihood strategies 
that appear non-economic: social infrastructure, social reproduction, and socio-spatial 
practices. These aspects of livelihood strategies are not commonly emphasized in existing 
studies.  
Chapter 2 discusses pertinent theoretical literatures. This thesis draws upon 
comparative urbanism, livelihood strategies, social reproduction, social infrastructure, 
and moral economy literatures to frame its understanding of livelihood strategies in the 
peri-urban spaces of China. First, this thesis justifies adopting Robinson’s (2016) 
comparative urbanism framework. Next, it emphasizes the importance of social 
infrastructure, social reproduction, and socio-spatial practices within livelihood strategies 
frameworks. Finally, this thesis asserts that comparative urbanism and livelihood 
strategies complement each other and are useful for comparing Chinese cities. Chapters 3 
and 4 integrate these two frameworks to compare Taiyuan, tier-1 cities, and other lower-
tiered cities.  
Chapter 3 first surveys the recent history of urbanization in China and the 
common lenses that scholars of Chinese urban studies have used to frame research. 
Subsequently, I draw on extant work and Statista’s economic data for Chinese cities to 
identify similarities and differences in the livelihood strategies of people living in peri-
urban spaces of tier-1 and lower-tiered cities (Huang et al., 2017; Lin and Gaubatz, 2017; 
Tynen, 2019; Tian et al., 2016).  
Following this discussion of resident and migrant worker livelihood strategies in 
the peri-urban areas of tier-1 and lower-tiered cities, Chapter 4 analyzes the data from 
one month of field work that I conducted in Taiyuan. While there, I researched the peri-
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urban district of Jinyuan. My findings are based on interviews with residents residing in 
that district. Interviews were undertaken to enhance understanding of how their 
livelihood strategies compare to those of residents in tier-1 and other lower-tiered cities, 
such as Xi’an, Suzhou, and Wenzhou (Qian and Xue, 2017; Lin and Gaubatz, 2017; 
Verdini, 2014).  
The literature review of peri-urban spaces in tier-1 and lower-tier cities brings 
some patterns regarding peoples’ livelihood strategies to the surface. Many peri-urban 
and urban village residents in tier-1 cities rent to migrant workers (Hsing, 2010; Wu, 
2016b). Those migrant workers then primarily work within the dominant economic sector 
in tier-1 cities—the service sector (Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics, 2020; Lin and 
Gaubatz, 2017; Shanghai Municipal Statistics Bureau, 2019). Peri-urban residents in 
lower-tiered cities rely upon a wider mixture of livelihood strategies, rather than the 
prevalence of renting to migrant workers found in tier-1 cities (Tian et al., 2016; 
Wilmsen, 2018).1  
This thesis, in chapter 4, shows that similar to other lower-tiered cities, Taiyuan’s 
peri-urban residents use a diverse set of livelihood strategies. But this thesis moves 
beyond many existing studies by showing how social infrastructure plays an important 
role in supporting resident livelihoods (c.f., Huang et al., 2017; Wilmsen, 2018; Tian et 
al., 2016; Ong, 2014).  
In chapter 5, I argue that the wider implications of this research are applicable not 
only for Chinese urban studies, but also for global urban studies. Tynen (2019, p. 173), 
 
1 However, this does not hold true for all lower-tiered citied. Wenzhou, a tier-2 city, is an example of peri-
urban residents renting to migrant workers. Migrant works comprise a significant portion of Wenzhou’s 
population (Lin and Gaubatz, 2017).  
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drawing upon Degen (2017), He et al. (2017), and Meyer (2009) as positive examples, 
asserts that “many of the currently existing studies on urban China neglect a holistic and 
grounded understanding of social and cultural life in the city.”  Inspired partly by her 
work, I argue that the comparison conducted in chapters 3 and 4 between Taiyuan, tier-1 
cities, and some lower-tiered cities will contribute to a more holistic understanding of 
Chinese urbanization by connecting the individuals’ livelihood strategies with social 
infrastructure, social reproduction, and socio-spatial practices.  
The importance of the foregoing three practices is not absent from, but often is 
not emphasized in, the livelihood strategies literature in China. Not only will Chinese 
urban studies benefit, but the kinds of comparisons made in this study could conceivably 
bring Chinese and global urban studies together. In a recent special issue of Urban 
Studies, scholars debated whether Chinese urban studies can contribute to global urban 
studies. For instance, Jonas (2020) argued that Chinese urban studies can, but Hamnett 
(2020) disagreed. This disagreement is essentially based on how one views the degree to 
which Chinese urbanization after the creation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 
is unique vis-a-vis urbanization in other countries (Jonas, 2020; Hamnett, 2020). Other 
scholars concur with Jonas (2020). For instance, Smith et al. (2019), who cite Leitner and 
Sheppard (2016), Robinson (2014), and Roy (2009), use a feminist and post-colonial 
perspective by attempting to extend the field of community development and planning, 
which has traditionally been characterized by global northern perspectives (p. 260). 
Similarly, He and Qian (2017), citing McFarlane (2011), Robinson (2011b), and Roy 
(2009, 2011), believe that Chinese urban studies can benefit by integrating the critical 
urban frameworks that Smith mentions as well. Agreeing with scholars such as Jonas 
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(2020), Smith et al. (2019), and He and Qian (2017), I draw on comparative urbanism 
(Robinson, 2016) by arguing that livelihoods frameworks—especially those emphasizing 
social infrastructure, social reproduction, and socio-spatial practices—can serve as 
important models for conducting comparisons between urbanization in China and around 
the world.  
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CHAPTER II: LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES: A COMPARATIVE URBANISM 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
Introduction 
 
Within the field of urban studies, there is a range of available frameworks and 
perspectives for researching urban spaces. These include planetary urbanization (Brenner 
and Schmid, 2015), provincializing urbanism (Sheppard et al., 2013), and comparative 
urbanism (Robinson, 2016). Each framework provides a slightly different perspective and 
methodology for conducting urban studies research. It was essential, for this research, to 
utilize a framework that seeks to expand the limits of comparison within urban studies 
research 
Planetary urbanization, commonly associated with Neil Brenner and Christian 
Schmid, frames urbanization as planetary in nature (Brenner and Schmid, 2015). 
Urbanization itself is characterized as capitalist urbanization (Brenner, 2018). Although 
helpful for understanding the various ways capitalism is closely associated with 
urbanization globally, planetary urbanization is not helpful because it does not provide 
the tools for conducting a comparison between tier-1 and lower-tiered cities in China, 
especially in terms of lacking methodological direction.  
A provincializing urbanism framework seemingly accords with what is needed for 
understanding livelihood strategies in China and beyond. Sheppard et al. (2013), drawing 
on Werner (2012), defined provincializing urbanism as “identifying and empowering new 
loci of enunciation from which to speak back against, thereby contesting, mainstream 
global urbanism” (p. 895) Provincializing urbanism can be contrasted with planetary 
urbanization because the latter centers on the various structures of capitalism in its 
examination of urbanization (Brenner, 2018). By focusing its analysis of urbanization on 
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capitalism, planetary urbanization is similar to mainstream global urbanism, which is 
broadly characterized by viewing capitalism and liberal democracy as answers to 
inequality in the Global South. It does so by framing an analysis of urbanization through 
the lens of capitalism (Sheppard et al., 2013, p. 894). It is mainstream global urbanism 
that provincializing urbanism problematizes. The provincializing urbanism framework’s 
main contribution to critical urban studies is championing understudied perspectives. 
Although that is valuable and necessary, it is bereft of a programmatic methodological 
framework for generating urban studies research in understudied areas.  
Robinson’s (2016) comparative urbanism framework proposes various methods 
for conducting research. Consequently, I adopted her perspective of embracing 
understudied cities and generating new urban studies knowledge by comparing these 
neglected areas to prevalent sites of urban studies research. Taiyuan, an underresearched 
city in China, will be compared to tier-1 and other lower-tiered cities to generate 
augmented insights into livelihood strategies.  
The first section of this chapter discusses comparative urbanism and how it affects 
a researcher’s perspective about conducting urban studies research. The second section 
describes livelihood strategies. A variety of fields, from peasant studies to urban studies, 
have used livelihoods frameworks (e.g., Bebbington, 1999; Tian et al., 2016). By 
focusing on the various economic and social strategies people use when seeking to 
improve their lives, a livelihoods framework is a valuable comparator when studying 
different cities: it enhances understandings of the effects of urbanization on a smaller 
scale—the scale of individuals and communities. The concluding section of this chapter 
briefly introduces the argument that will be expatiated on in chapter 5—utilizing both 
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comparative urbanism and livelihoods frameworks is one way urban studies researchers 
can overcome the divide between Chinese and global urban studies.  
2.1. Urban Studies in China and Beyond: Using Comparative Urbanism 
 
Robinson (2016), seemingly the leading advocate for comparative urbanism, 
avers that Anglo-American ideas have dominated urban studies (Robinson, 2016). 
Robinson (2016, p. 5), citing Ward (2010) and Robinson (2011a), argues that scholars 
should analyze “specific elements or processes in cities, or the circulations and 
connections which shape cities, thus rendering urban experiences comparable across a 
much wider range of contexts.” This argument impelled me to compare livelihood 
strategies and urbanization processes in Taiyuan to other cities in China.  
Robinson (2016, p. 8) draws from Marxist political-economic epistemology and 
concurs with Marx (1993 [1939]) by rejecting totalities that study “all instances of a 
particular phenomenon [that] could be seen to form a part of a lateral totality (cutting 
across time and space) of that phenomenon or concept (such as labour).” Rather, she 
believes that urban studies should examine cities through their unique combinations of 
relationships, processes, and histories (Robinson, 2016). Researchers embracing this 
perspective are more open to new urban sites which can contribute new perspectives to 
knowledge derived from well-studied research sites. At the forefront of Robinson’s 
comparative urbanism framework is a desire to view all cities, and the historical 
processes that produce them, as equal research sites contributing to urban studies 
(Robinson, 2016).  
Scholars using a comparative urbanism framework can diversify knowledge of 
urban areas in China because Chinese urban studies has mostly been informed by detailed 
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analyses of tier-1 cities and coastal areas (e.g., Hsing 2010; Inverardi-Ferri 2018; Smith, 
2014; Wu 2016b). Instead, a comparative urbanism framework suggests researching 
lower-tiered cities, as well as tier-1 cities, to promote a more nuanced understanding of 
urbanization in China.  
Comparative urbanism additionally contributes to the conversation within Chinese 
urban studies that asks whether Chinese urban studies scholars can bring their research 
into conversation with scholars researching other parts of the globe. Hamnett (2020) and 
Jonas (2020) have explored this issue. Hamnett (2020) asserts that Chinese urban studies 
could be used to compare and contrast processes and phenomena across different areas 
globally. However, he concludes that “Chinese urbanisation and processes are so 
different from both western and other developing country experiences that it is difficult to 
subsume them” (p. 697). Jonas (2020, p. 707) also believes that urban processes in China 
can be compared to non-Chinese cities, but he does not have the same doubt as Hamnett: 
“China’s urban development processes are neither exclusively unique nor fundamentally 
resistant to theorisation. They are in this respect essentially comparable and thus highly 
amendable to theoretically informed generalization.” Jonas (2020), as Robinson (2016), 
proposes comparing similar processes across different cities to produce increased 
generalizable understanding. An argument central to this thesis, per Jonas’s interpretation 
of Chinese urbanization, is that Chinese and global urban studies can contribute to each 
other when using processes as the mode of comparison.  
Livelihood strategies are affected by both current and historical processes. The 
strategies people use, as will be shown in chapters 3 and 4, are a result of macro-level 
policies, cultural norms, and individual choices. How these various aspects interact with 
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each other in different cities can be understood as a process by which to augment 
understanding urbanization in different cities. Therefore, I argue, in chapter 5, that 
analyzing livelihood strategies in different cities can serve as a mode of comparison 
between cities in and outside of China.  
2.2 Conceptualizing a Livelihoods Framework 
This thesis uses a livelihoods framework to analyze urbanization in China, a 
framework usually used for researching rural areas (Huang et al., 2017; Tian et al., 2016; 
Wilmsen, 2018). A livelihoods framework examines how people and groups at different 
scales utilize available resources (Scoones, 1998).  Scoones (1998, p. 3) defines a 
livelihoods framework as consisting of four elements:  
[The] context  (of policy setting, politics, history, agroecology and socio-
economic conditions), what combination of livelihood resources (different types 
of ‘capital’) result in the ability to follow what combination of livelihood 
strategies (agricultural intensification/extensification, livelihood diversification 
and migration) with what outcomes” (emphasis in original). (p. 3) 
Each element (context, livelihood resources, and livelihood strategies) is unique to an 
individual or group. Therefore, it is important to understand the contexts that affect a 
person’s ability to employ certain strategies.  
The livelihood strategies a person chooses are not static and must contend with 
changing contexts. Scoones (1998, p. 5), drawing on Chambers and Conway (1992), 
states that the Institute of Development Studies defines a livelihood as sustainable if “it 
can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities 
and assets, while not undermining the natural resource base.” The research context they 
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are referring to is an agrarian setting, but it is clearly applicable to peri-urban spaces. In 
peri-urban spaces, stresses and shocks can additionally come in the form of economic 
policy changes, alterations to people’s social lives, and modifications to their access to 
housing and infrastructure.  
The livelihoods framework I apply examines the context of peri-urban residents, 
with a focus on how that context impacts the individual’s and community's ability to use 
certain resources, such as vegetables. The resources that form the foundation of 
livelihood strategies are categorized into five forms of capital: natural, financial, human, 
social, and cultural (Bebbington, 1999; Scoones, 1998). Scoones (1998) limits his 
analysis of capital to natural, financial, human, and social; alternatively, Bebbington 
(1999), uses the term “produced capital” instead of “financial capital,” but the two are 
virtually comparable. Scoones (1998, pp. 7-8) defines natural capital as environmental 
resources and services; financial capital as financial assets, infrastructure, and production 
equipment; human capital as skills, knowledge, and good health; and social capital as 
“the social resources (networks, social claims, social relations, affiliations, associations) 
upon which people draw when pursuing different livelihood strategies requiring 
coordinated actions.”  
Bebbington’s also includes cultural capital as a livelihood resource, an often 
overlooked feature of livelihoods analyses in Chinese urban studies. Justifying inclusion 
of this resource, Bebbington (1994), drawing on Kleymeyer (1994) asserts the following: 
Beyond being simply meaningful, such practices are, however, also 
enabling and empowering. They enable forms of action and resistance that 
the other four types of capital would not, alone, make possible. They can 
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also be the basis for the maintenance and enhancement of each of the other 
types of capital. (p. 2034) 
Similarly, Kleymeyer (1994) connects cultural practices to development and economics. 
His discussion of the relationship between cultural expression and development are 
notable in two ways. The first is how cultural practices strengthen community identities. 
He (Kleymeyer, 1994, p. 19) states that “[w]ithout a sense of community, individuals 
retreat into their families or themselves, to the detriment of collaborative efforts at 
survival or betterment.” The second is that cultural expression and local forms of 
economic production can “promote group solidarity and pride” (pp. 26-27). Both 
strategies, which involve the community at-large, for improving people’s lives and 
feelings of solidarity are essential for understanding livelihood strategies but tend to be 
overlooked in Chinese urban studies literature.   
Socio-spatial practices that create strong bonds within the community are 
important because they can be understood as part of social reproduction. For example, 
Frederiksen (2015) espouses that libraries have a role in social reproduction, as they 
provide an important example for linking public spaces with social reproduction. 
Drawing on Katz (2011), she (2015) presents the political-economic characteristics of 
social reproduction:  
The political-economic aspect of social reproduction involves the acquisition and 
circulation of work knowledge and skills, and the learning required to maintain 
and reinforce categories of difference and the cultural practices that naturalize the 
social organization of reproductive labor. (p. 142) 
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Nonetheless, Frederiksen (2015), using Bakker and Gill (2003), Bakker and Silvey 
(2008), Eldholm, Harris, and Young (1977), broadened social reproduction beyond the 
strict political-economic interpretation to include “the work of care, socialization, and the 
fulfillment of human needs that stem from basic survival and human biological 
reproduction” (p. 143). Moreover, she proposes that libraries indeed give access to 
knowledge that is vital to provide employees with requisite job knowledge, but they also 
are a means for showing how social reproduction is tied to the use of space. The socio-
spatial practices in China (e.g., the descriptions in my interviews of exercising in groups 
in the morning and playing majiang in each other’s homes) are forms of social 
reproduction. Such socio-spatial practices create strong social bonds that are tied to 
livelihood strategies, as will be demonstrated in chapters 3 and 4.  
Frederiksen (2015) does not use the concept of social infrastructure, but social 
infrastructure is related to how social reproduction and socio-spatial activities are 
embedded in the peri-urban space of Taiyuan. The concept of social infrastructure was 
developed by Klinenberg (2018), who argues that social infrastructure is important for 
the well-being of individuals and communities. He (p. 5) differentiates between social 
capital and social infrastructure:  
“Social infrastructure is not ‘social capital’ —a concept commonly used to 
measure people’s relationships and interpersonal networks—but the 
physical conditions that determine whether social capital develops.” 
Broadly, infrastructure often is characterized as the roads, bridges, and sewer systems 
that allow cities, for example, to operate and potentially flourish (Klinenberg, 2018). 
However, social infrastructure is different. Many aspects can be included in social 
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infrastructure, from libraries and sidewalks to community organizations (Ibid., p. 16). 
Social infrastructure, according to Klinenberg (2018, p. 20-21), is vital for communities 
to thrive because without it the social ties, or “social and civic life” are damaged. Latham 
and Layton (2019, p. 8), utilizing Klinenberg’s (2018) concept of social infrastructure, 
connect social infrastructure to Amin’s (2008) concept of social surplus: 
The social connections and socialities that are built and maintained through 
accessing social infrastructure have real material benefits and consequences; they 
generate a “social surplus”—encouraging trust, civility, encounter, and common 
purpose. (p. 8) 
They demonstrate how the social aspects of livelihood strategies discussed in this 
thesis—such as trust and common purpose—that are less emphasized in livelihood 
strategies literature are embedded within social infrastructure.  
When people make economic choices based on their cultural values and social 
bonds, they are playing a role in a moral economy. Millar (2015, p. 8), drawing on 
Thompson (1971), defines a moral economy as “an economy organized not by the model 
of a natural, self-regulating, free market but by a set of customary duties, rights, and 
practices of different classes in relation to one another.”  As will be discussed in chapter 
4, the peri-urban economy in Taiyuan, partly fits Millar’s outline of a moral economy, 
especially within informal economic strategies. The informal economy, within which the 
moral economy is a part of, is defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) as “all economic activities by workers and economic units that 
are – in law or in practice – not covered or insufficiently covered by formal 
arrangements” (OECD/ILO, 2019, p. 155). The moral economy, which is not a formal 
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arrangement, in Jinyuan is partly maintained by the combination of socio-spatial 
practices, social reproduction, and social infrastructure.  
Socio-spatial practices that are a part of the social reproduction of the community 
where I conducted my research, such as daily morning exercises, create strong social 
bonds between neighbors. Those socio-spatial practices involve neighbors in spaces of 
social infrastructure. Social bonds that are created through shared socio-spatial activities 
underly the moral economy of the community which relies on the social bonds that can 
be used as social capital. The moral economy in the peri-urban space of Taiyuan responds 
to gaps in peoples’ livelihood strategies, such as when vegetables used for subsistence are 
not ripe. In Chinese urban studies, scholars analyzing the social conditions of individuals 
and communities tend not to emphasize the importance of social infrastructure, social 
reproduction, and the socio-spatial practices embedded within them. As will be discussed 
subsequently in more detail, they are vital for understanding people’s lives in urban 
contexts. 
Conclusion 
Urban studies discussions regarding the definition of urban spaces and those 
spaces’ location remain unsettled. Ultimately, this research gap affords an opportunity to 
undertake new ways of conducting urbanization research (Robinson, 2016). Accordingly, 
I aim to contribute to Chinese urban studies literature by studying the livelihood 
strategies in the peri-urban space of Taiyuan. A livelihoods framework that emphasizes 
the role of social infrastructure, social reproduction, and socio-spatial practices, produces 
an augmented holistic understanding of the livelihood strategies in tier-1 and lower-tiered 
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cities. Furthermore, this thesis argues that livelihood strategies, when viewed as a 
process, can be a comparator between cities.  
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CHAPTER III: AN EXAMINATION OF LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES IN 
CHINESE CITIES 
 
Introduction 
 
 China’s period of economic reform and growth began in the 1980s. Historically, 
Chinese urban studies researchers have focused on cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Guangzhou, where much of China’s economic reform has occurred. However, 
urbanization and economic development patterns are changing, so researchers must 
adapt. This chapter will first discuss the recent history of Chinese urbanization. It will 
then consider lenses Chinese urban studies scholars have used to understand cities; 
contextualize the history and narratives of Chinese urbanization; map the livelihood 
strategies of peri-urban residents in both tier-1 cities and lower-tiered cities; and conclude 
by discussing why Taiyuan is an important case study for understanding the broader 
context of Chinese urbanization and livelihood strategies.  
3.1 Urbanization in China 
 
3.1.1 The History of Chinese Urbanization 
 
 Demarcating the beginning of Chinese urbanization is difficult, but chapter 3 (as 
well as 4) will concentrate on the post-1978 economic reform period. Policies from 
China’s 1949-1978 communist era, however, continue to affect Chinese cities today. 
Urban residents were then part of a danwei (单位), or work unit, that gave urban 
residents access to housing and state welfare benefits. This led urban residents to be “a 
relatively privileged group in Chinese society,” while rural residents had a lower standard 
of living and less access to state welfare benefits than their urban counterparts (Naughton, 
2018, p. 129).  
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The foregoing phenomenon is commonly understood as the household registration 
system that began in 1958—referred to as the hukou system both in Chinese and English 
(Chan, 2014, p. 2). Li et al. (2016, p. 517) argues that the “system, introduced in the 
1950s to control population mobility, was designed to differentiate rural and urban 
citizens according to place of origin.” Contextualizing this social stratification is 
important. It was implemented in the era of China’s Big Push industrialization initiative 
in the 1950s and was meant to “extract low-cost food and fibers from the farmers, while 
the urban system was used to build industry” (Naughton, 2018, p. 129). This inequality 
was used to grow China’s industrial economy. Even after China started to reform and 
open its economy after 1978, the hukou system and its effects persisted in different 
forms.  
 Although this system of inequality existed in the communist era, its effects 
became tied to urbanization after 1978, with the advent of rapid urbanization (Naughton, 
2018, p. 137). Chen et al. (2018), drawing on such scholars as Long et al. (2009), Ma and 
Fan (1994), Bai et al. (2011), He and Wu (2009), Lin and Yi (2011), and Wu (1997; 
2001), subdivide the history of reform-era Chinese urbanization into two periods: 1979-
1995 and 1996-2015. The first era was characterized by rapid urbanization, which the 
central government did not direct; rather, it was engendered by township village 
enterprises (TVEs) and other bottom-up mechanisms. The second era of urbanization was 
typified by local government-led land financing focused on the urbanization of space 
rather than the well-being of the people who inhabited it (Chen et al. 2018). Regions on 
the coast benefitted from these urbanization and development processes, as the inland 
provinces sent millions of migrant workers to these areas.  
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The number of internal migrants  to coastal regions is staggering (Naughton, 
2018):  
From 1990 to 2010, 36.4 million people moved to Guangdong Province, and 28 
million to the three Lower Yangtze provinces of Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang. 
Together, these two regions attracted about half of all long-distance migrants. (p. 
140) 
This massive rural-to-urban migration was the reason for approximately 41% of urban 
growth in China (Naughton, 2018, p. 137). Cities grew largely from this influx of 
migrants. This contextualizes why cities such as Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Beijing have 
been sites of urbanization and economic growth, as well as the focus of Chinese urban 
studies scholars. The map below of China, its provinces, and cities shows where the 
provinces and cities discussed in this thesis are:  
 
 
 
 
(Figure 1. Map of China, its provinces, and cities [Renamed original title for thesis], 
CartoGIS Services, 2020, originally licensed under 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/. ) 
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3.1.2 China’s National New-type Urbanization Plan 
 
 These foregoing urbanization and development patterns are changing. In prior 
decades, millions of migrants left their inland provinces for coastal regions; now, 
however, “[f]armers in central and western China are finding more opportunities closer to 
home, both in the growing cities of the interior and small towns near their farms” 
(Naughton, 2018, p. 140). These shifts in migration patterns are an example of the 
intended outcomes of the National New-type Urbanization Plan (2014-2020), also 
referred to as the New Urbanization Plan (Li et. al., 2016). The impetus for the plan came 
from the Chinese government’s hope to use urbanization to combat the slowing of 
China’s economy after the global economic crisis of 2007, while avoiding the lack of 
access to social services and adequate housing for internal migrants that marred earlier 
forms of urbanization. The three broad aims of the National New-type Urbanization are: 
create shared policy goals, emphasize regional urban development, and prioritize 
sustainable urban development  (Li et al., 2016).   
One of the New Urbanization Plan’s goals is related to migrant workers’ efforts to 
become citizens of the city to which they migrate (Chen et al., 2018). The impact of 
altering the hukou registration system may well be marked. However, Li et al. (2016) feel 
that with migration restrictions in place, hukou reforms will not induce dramatic changes. 
The hukou reforms are dependent, in part, on population size (Li et al., 2016). Cities with 
populations of 500,000 to one million residents can grant permanent residency with little 
restriction, but the cities that have been the center of rural-to-urban migration and have 
large populations (Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou) will maintain a very restricted 
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permanent residency system (Li et al., 2016). This raises the question of whether the New 
Urbanization Plan can reduce the inequalities produced by the hukou system. This issue 
and other economic, social, and political effects of the New Urbanization Plan have been 
minimally discussed in academic literature (Chen et al., 2019, p. 1).  
 Chen et al.’s paper research on Anhui, one of the two pilot areas for this new form 
of urbanization, contributes to understanding of China’s New Urbanization Plan. In total, 
there were two pilot provinces: Anhui and Jiangsu. Anhui offers the Chinese government 
an opportunity to observe the effects of this new form of urbanization in a region that is 
still developing, while Jiangsu allows the government to see these new urbanization 
policies interact with an already developed region (Chen et al., 2019).  Chen et al. (2019) 
propose that findings from the Anhui pilot project can enhance understanding of how 
such urbanization would occur in areas that are also developing, such as central and 
western China. Given that these policies will continue to be implemented in regions 
similar to Anhui, research in lower-tiered cities, such as Taiyuan, will contribute to 
knowledge about how urbanization patterns are changing in new sites of urbanization.  
3.1.3 Common Viewpoints Used to Understand Chinese Cities  
 
Synthesizing a body of literature as extensive as Chinese urban studies is difficult. 
The four common areas of study in Chinese urban studies, according to He and Qian 
(2017, p. 829), are the following: the making of global cities in China, the overlap 
between housing and land development, the spatial and social patterns of poverty, and 
migrant workers’ experiences in relationship to macro urbanization processes in China. 
Throughout this thesis, literature related to these four themes is discussed.  
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The common topics focused on within Chinese urban studies are beginning to 
change. He and Qian (2017, p. 836) believe that emerging areas of research include 
fragmentation of the uses of space within cities, the rise of China’s middle class, and 
citizens’ assertion of their right to a given city. He and Qian, citing McFarlane (2011), 
Robinson (2011b), and Roy (2009; 2011), contend scholars’ shift to studying more of the 
lived experiences within Chinese cities affords an opportunity to draw on critical urban 
studies frameworks, such as comparative urbanism, and critical theoretical bodies of 
literature, including post-colonial and feminist scholarship (He and Qian, 2017, pp. 839, 
841).   
 This thesis contributes to the growing body of literature that prioritizes the lived 
experiences within Chinese cities. Wu (2016a) and Logan (2018) are examples of this 
common tension within Chinese urban studies; Wu’s categorization of Chinese urban 
studies contrasts Logan’s argument for more bottom-up and varied understanding of the 
relationship among urbanization, the state, and individuals.  
Wu (2016a) avers that China offers a synthesis of two forms of urban 
development that can be studied by urban studies scholars: neoliberal-led urban 
development and East Asia state-led development. He (2016a) castigates merely 
understanding Chinese urban studies through neoliberal development. His analysis of 
Chinese urban development, citing Tsui and Wang (2004), highlights the tax reform of 
1994; as a result of this reform, local government’s relied upon income derived from land 
development sales, which helped to overcome the inability to borrow from the capital 
market (Wu, 2016a). Though this emphasis on the market could be interpreted as 
neoliberal development, Wu (2016a) proposes that the market is on one side and the state 
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in articulating its development goals via the market is on the other; this situation produces 
a blend of neoliberal and East Asian state-led urban development.  
Wu (2016a), drawing on Wu and Phelps (2011), posits that the development of 
suburbs around Beijing is not a market-driven creation, but rather a production by the 
state’s desire for a Beijing-Tianjin development corridor. He (2016a) shows that Chinese 
urban studies offers an opportunity to study issues such as the role of the state and market 
in urban development, marginalization in urban areas, land use patterns, gated 
communities, and edge cities. Ultimately, Wu (2016a) concedes that there is a 
supranational process of development, though this process does not efface existing 
structures, institutions, or cultures. Rather, he sees urbanization as rearticulated through 
its interaction with localized contexts. Viewing macro-processes as the essence of 
urbanization while concurrently having localized differences is one way of studying and 
framing Chinese urban studies. However, it is still a top-down analysis that ignores the 
bottom-up effects upon Chinese urban development. In contrast to Wu (2016a), Logan 
(2018) discusses the changing patterns in Chinese urban studies that embrace a bottom-up 
approach to exploring Chinese cities.  
 Similar to how He and Qian (2017) describe the common themes within Chinese 
urban studies, Logan (2018) states that research in Chinese urban studies commonly 
views urbanization as a top-down, planned coordination of the Chinese central 
government with the market and thus ignores individual agency (Logan, 2018). He 
highlights two strands of Chinese urban studies that offer alternate perspectives. The first 
views China’s governance system as multifaceted rather than monolithic. The second 
perceives “[Chinese citizens] as actively adapting, strategising and manipulating the 
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conditions of their lives, certainly not in control of their futures but both knowledgeable 
and active” (Logan, 2018, p. 1376).  The centering of individual agency within Chinese 
urban studies, though overlooked in the past, is an apposite lens through which to study 
Chinese urbanization.  
This thesis aims to understand urbanization in Taiyuan through focusing on the 
everyday experiences of individuals living through urbanization processes. This 
discussion thus far has primarily focused on two common perspectives Chinese urban 
studies scholars use to analyze urbanization: top-down analyses or bottom-up analyses. 
The analyses of livelihood strategies in sections 3.2 and 3.3 will discuss macro-processes 
in tier-1 and lower-tiered cities but prioritize the understanding of livelihood strategies in 
those cities from the bottom-up in order to contribute to this burgeoning perspective in 
Chinese urban studies.  
3.2 Livelihood Strategies in Tier-1 Cities 
 
3.2.1 Formal Economic Livelihood Strategies 
 
 A formal livelihoods framework is not commonly used to research urban and peri-
urban spaces in China. For this thesis, livelihoods are considered to a combination of 
formal economic activities, informal economic activities, as well as social infrastructure, 
social reproduction, and socio-spatial practices (Klinenberg, 2018; Frederiksen, 2015; 
Zhang et al., 2018). This definition purposefully encapsulates a wide range of potential 
livelihood strategies. By doing so it allows me to draw on scholars engaging with 
livelihood strategies but not necessarily using a broader livelihoods framework (Tynen, 
2019; Inverardi-Ferri, 2018; Smith, 2014). A wide range of literature that engages with 
livelihood strategies exists.  
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To begin to contextualize the formal economies in tier-1 cities, this thesis 
discusses the economic sectors of those cities. This section compares the economies and 
employment data, from the data aggregator Statista2, of tier-1 cities (Beijing, Chongqing, 
Shanghai, and Tianjin). (This section does not discuss Guangzhou—a tier-1 city—as  its 
data were unavailable on Statista.) Additionally, each city did not have the same amount 
or type of data available. For example, data was available for the distribution of 
Chongqing’s gross domestic product (GDP) across its economic sectors from 2014 to 
2018, but I only have data for the distribution of Beijing’s GDP from 2018 and 2019. 
Employment data was also scarce. Shanghai and Tianjin were the only tier-1 cities with 
employment data in each sector.  
An imperfect, but useful understanding of the economies in tier-1 cities is 
presented here. Among tier-1 cities, the largest share of their GDP is in the tertiary sector. 
Statista commonly categorized the economic sectors into agriculture, industry, and 
services, though for example, Shanghai maintains the commonly used categorization of 
the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors. Having the economic sector data broken into 
primary, secondary, and tertiary would be preferable, but the extant alternatives are still 
good indicators of how the economy is distributed amongst the different sectors. The 
percentage of primary/agricultural, secondary/industry, and tertiary/services sectors 
contributions to each city’s GDP is shown in tables 1, 2, and 3 (Beijing Municipal Bureau 
 
2 Statista is a multi-national company that provides both market and consumer data for its customers. The 
data consolidated by Statista is available through paid accounts. I accessed the data through my University 
of Oregon Statista account (Statista, n.d.).  
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of Statistics, 2020; Chongqing Municipal Statistics Bureau, 2020a;  National Bureau of 
Statistics, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c; Tianjin Municipal Statistics Bureau. 2020a)3:  
 
 
Table 1: Primary/agricultural sector as percentage of GDP 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Beijing .8% .8% .8% .7% .6% .5% .4% .4% .3% 
Chongqing    6.9% 6.8% 7% 6.6% 6.8% 6.6% 
Shanghai .7% .6% .6% .5% .4% .4% .4% .3%  
Tianjin 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% .99% .97% .97% .91% .92%  
 
 
 
Table 2: Secondary/industry sector as percentage of GDP 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Beijing 22.6% 22.1% 21.6% 21.3% 19.7% 19.3% 19% 16.5% 16.2% 
Chongqing    46.3% 45.6% 44.7% 44.2% 40.9% 40.2% 
Shanghai 41.3% 38.9% 36.2% 34.7% 31.8% 29.8% 30.5% 29.8%  
Tianjin 52.9% 52.2% 50.9% 49.7% 47.1% 42.4% 40.9% 40.5%  
 
 
 
3 In this thesis, if the percentages were already provided I did not round the percentages, but I rounded for 
percentages that were not already provided. As a result, some percentages within certain categorizations do 
not add up perfectly to 100 percent. 
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Table 3: Tertiary/service sector as percentage of GDP  
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Beijing 76.6% 77.1% 77.6% 78% 79.7% 80.2% 80.6% 83.1% 83.5% 
Chongqing    46.8% 47.6% 48.3% 49.2% 52.3% 53.2% 
Shanghai 58% 60.5% 63.2% 64.8% 67.8% 69.8% 69.2% 69.9%  
Tianjin 45.9% 46.7% 48.1% 49.3% 51.9% 56.6% 58.2% 58.6%  
  
A tier-1 city’s GDP is distributed differently depending on which city is 
examined, though the tertiary/services and the secondary/industry are a significant 
proportion of all of these cities’ total GDP. Chongqing’s GDP from 2014 to 2019 was 
distributed across the industry and service sectors more evenly than was Beijing’s or 
Shanghai’s (Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics, 2020; Chongqing Municipal 
Statistics Bureau, 2020a;  National Bureau of Statistics, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c). In 2014, 
the percentage of Chongqing’s GDP in the services sector was 46.8% and in the industry 
sector 46.3%. In 2018, its services sector accounted for 53.2% of GDP, while the industry 
sector was 40.2%. Chongqing does have a slightly higher percentage of GDP in the 
primary/agricultural sector compared to Shanghai’s and Beijing’s. Tianjin’s economy is 
similar to Chongqing’s: it has a more even breakdown between the agricultural and 
industry sectors. However, between 2011 and 2018 the metrics between the industry and 
service sectors flipped. In 2011, the industry sector comprised 52.9% of GDP; in 2018, 
though, it was 40.5%. These values can be compared to the services sector—45.9%% of 
GDP in 2011 and 58.6% of GDP in 2018 (Tianjin Municipal Statistics Bureau, 2020a). 
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Clearly, all tier-1 cities rely heavily on the services as their largest economic sectors, 
though Chongqing’s service and industry sectors are relatively similar. 
 In addition to the GDP being predominantly generated by the tertiary and industrial 
sectors in tier-1 cities, those sectors are also the biggest employers in Tianjin and 
Shanghai. Table 4 shows what percentage the workers in Shanghai’s (Shanghai 
Municipal Statistics Bureau, 2019) primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors; Table 5 
displays Tianjin’s (Tianjin Municipal Statistics Bureau, 2020b) workforce within the 
agricultural, industry, and service sectors. Although the employment data do not 
encompass all tier-1 cities, they do infer a possible pattern regarding where people are 
employed in such cities: their primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors are similarly 
ranked. 
Table 4: Percentage of the workforce in Shanghai’s economic sectors 
 2018 
Primary 2.9% 
Secondary 30.7% 
Tertiary 66.3% 
 
Table 5: Percentage of the workforce in Tianjin’s economic sectors 
 2018 
Agricultural 6.7% 
Industry 31.8% 
Service 61.5% 
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 A specific example of a formal livelihood strategy not found in the data is that of 
a strategy at the community level. Hsing’s (2010) analysis of the Shuping Village in 
Guangzhou, and Guangzhou more broadly, acutely illustrates the transformation of 
Shuping Village into a shareholding company, or what Hsing describes as a 
“shareholding cooperative system” (p. 132). According to Hsing (2010, p. 133), 
shareholding cooperative systems are a product of the unique history of shared communal 
land in China, as well as the fragmented opening of the economy at the village level. 
Shareholding cooperative systems arose when households began to have their own plots 
of land. As Hsing (2010, p. 132) notes: “In the 1990s, migrant workers and entrepreneurs 
continued to pour into the delta, looking for places to build factories and to live.” 
However, as the industrial economies began to grow, villagers, having rented individual 
plots of land to migrant workers and entrepreneurs, decided to create shareholding 
cooperative systems. They pooled their land into these arrangements and received 
dividends from the new collective instead of individually receiving rental payments from 
those migrant workers and entrepreneurs leasing their land (Hsing, 2010, p. 133). The 
benefits of this alternative was “that the centralized management of collective assets 
helped to achieve economies of scale and improve distribution between well-endowed 
and poorly endowed associations” (Hsing, 2010, p. 135). Not only do shareholding 
companies in villages “oversee local affairs on behalf of the city government,” but they 
also provide welfare through their distribution of medical care and cash dividends (Hsing, 
2010, p. 136).  
 The last formal livelihood strategy to be discussed is compensation received from 
the government for moving from a village or peri-urban space into an urban space. This is 
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a common phenomenon in China. Jiang et al. (2018) found that compensation for 
resettlement in the peri-urban space of Shanghai where they conducted their field 
research could be monetary or a combination of monetary and access to subsidized 
housing. However, Wilmsen’s (2018) discussion of compensation in a lower-tiered city 
shows that compensation given to resettled residents, in her case study, was not 
sufficient: “There was a significant level of dissatisfaction with their compensation and 
an overwhelming feeling of having lost out” (Jiang et al., 2018, p. 3213). This was for a 
variety of reasons, but one discussed is the lack of money left over after all the necessary 
expenses that occur when moving, which is coupled with a lack of job opportunities.  
3.2.2 Informal Economic Livelihood Strategies  
Four types of informal economic activities (or strategies) will be discussed: 
renting of rooms to migrant workers, illegal or informal township development, 
economic diversification, and mutual support networks. Hsing’s (2010) analysis of urban 
development in China in the 1990s and 2000s will initially be used to guide this 
discussion.  
Both Hsing (2010) and Zhao and Zhang (2016) analyzed the role of illegal or 
informal development. Renting to migrant workers is a common strategy in which peri-
urban villagers earn a living, especially in tier-1 cities. Per Hsing (2010):  
By 1993, as the nationwide construction fever peaked and a growing number of 
migrants poured into Guangzhou and Shenzhen, villager-land-lords rebuilt their 
houses up to five or six stories high, violating building codes that set the 
maximum at three stories or 80 m in height. (pp. 127-128) 
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The number of migrant workers moving to cities such as Guangzhou is massive. It has 
allowed for the “villager-land-lords” (as Hsing refers to them) to rely upon renting space 
in their homes as a source of income (Hsing, 2010, pp. 127-128). Wu’s (2016b) study of 
urban villages in three tier-1 cities reveals the proportion of migrants to residents living in 
the urban villages he studies. His (2016b, p. 857) data suggest that, of the villagers he 
surveyed from urban villages in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, the percentage of the 
heads of household respondents who were migrants was respectively 86.5%, 79.7%, and 
72.2%, respectively. These metrics imply that a large portion of the population in these 
urban villages consisted of migrant workers who are renting housing. 
Although the preceding offers an example of an informal livelihood strategy 
employed by individuals, larger political units can also use informal methods of 
development. In fact, 75 percent of developments have been observed to be illegal and a 
result of “unauthorized occupation of farmland” (Hsing, 2010, p. 159; Xu, 2004, p. 141). 
The illegality stems from “township government leaders, village collaborators, and 
developers] us[ing] farmland for construction by going through neither the formal 
procedural for ownership transfer from the collective to the state, nor through the 
approval process of farmland conversion for non-farm uses” (Hsing, 2010, p. 160). This 
illegal development that villages undertake “provide[s] for their [villagers’] own 
livelihoods, compensating for the lack of the welfare from the state government in the 
context of the dual rural-urban social security system” (Zhao and Zhang, 2016, p. 257). 
This milieu highlights how living in the peri-urban space produces precarity for rural 
residents owing to a lack of access to state welfare programs. Smith (2014, p. 371) 
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defines China’s peri-urban space with reference to the parlousness engendered by living 
in that space: 
This peri-urban condition produced substantial precarity, as residents were 
integrated into exploitative urban institutions beyond their control, including state 
planning, political patronage, and market competition. Formal state welfare, far 
from offering greater stability, was seen as unreliable and exploitative, 
compromised by the very political and economic institutions that engendered 
residents’ precarity. (p. 371) 
Zhao and Zhang (2016) posit that township governments are addressing this precarity. 
Indeed, they (2016, pp. 257, 272) note that ownership governments “share the same goals 
as rural villages,” and are more focused on “social stability and the quality of life in rural 
areas.”  
In addition to renting rooms to migrant workers and undertaking illegal township 
development, mutual support networks and economic diversification also serve an 
important purpose in residents’ livelihood strategies. Smith (2014) analyzed the 
relationship between these informal strategies and China’s formal state welfare. He 
critiques China’s dibao (低保), or subsistence allowance. The dibao welfare system is 
meant to support individuals with the lowest standards of living; however, access to it is 
tied to one’s household registration. This situation leads indigent residents in the peri-
urban space to pursue such informal strategies as mutual support networks and economic 
diversification (Smith, 2014).  
 Mutual support networks have value in withstanding crises (Smith, 2014). One of 
the two mutual support networks that Smith (2014) describes is informal housing 
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construction (e.g., adding rooms to one’s home or building). It is used to adapt to 
potential familial crises or to pursue business opportunities. For instance, Smith (2014) 
describes how one family built a three-story home, thus affording all family members to 
live in the same single structure simultaneously in their own living space. Per Smith 
(2014), living under one roof fosters development and maintenance of close relationships 
that are central to those individuals’ mutual support networks.   
A second mutual support network is a community support network that relies on 
“the spatial infrastructure for networks of mutual support beyond the family” that is used 
to attend to fellow community members (Smith, 2014, p. 376). For example, one of 
Smith’s participants “felt comfortable allowing his learning-disabled daughter to wander 
unsupervised around the village, counting on neighbors and friends to intervene if she 
encountered trouble.” Such social networks help individuals overcome potential 
hardships, which are overlooked when the government forcibly moves residents into 
multi-story apartment buildings.  
 Similar to mutual support networks, economic diversification is an informal 
strategy that Smith (2014) describes that relies on relationships with others. Economic 
diversification and mutual support networks are a response to different potential 
hardships (Smith, 2014):  
In addition to coping with risk through ex post consumption smoothing based on 
mutual support networks, Hailong residents also pursued ex ante risk mitigation 
strategies designed to smooth income through economic diversification. (p. 377) 
In his research, economic diversification was frequently achieved by placing investments 
in different locations. People would often utilize family members’ migration to spread 
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their economic investments into different locations. Indeed, Smith (2014, p. 379) notes 
that these informal strategies are not undertaken in isolation of each other:  
Residents were thus proactively engaging with markets in order to diversify 
income at precisely the same time that they were maintaining networks of mutual 
support in order to smooth consumption. (p. 379)  
Although their research was not in a predominantly urban or peri-urban space in a tier-1 
city, Tian et al. (2016), discussed this same issue, as well as its implications for future 
urbanization plans: 
[China needs to] adapt its development policy to promote healthy rural-urban 
development dynamics throughout the course of urbanization…focusing only on 
one (any) factor is not likely effective and may produce unintended consequences 
due to the interactions of a variety of factors that contribute to the overall two-
sector dynamics. (p. 585)  
This foregoing issue raised by Smith (2014) and Tian et al. (2016) is particularly 
important to consider, as it suggests how individuals can create a successful livelihood 
strategy by having diverse sources of income.  
3.2.3 Social infrastructure, Social Reproduction, and Socio-Spatial Practices  
Social infrastructure and the socio-spatial practices embedded within it are less 
emphasized foci in livelihood strategies literature. This section discusses social 
infrastructure and socio-spatial activities from the work of Inverardi-Ferri (2018) on 
waste recyclers in Beijing. His context was Dongxiaokou, formerly one of the largest 
waste recycling markets in Beijing. However, the spread of urbanization has caused that 
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neighborhood to change. In his analysis, Inverardi-Ferri (2018) describes the use of 
mobility both between formal and informal labor, and in and around space:  
Some mobilities occur in the physical space of the city (and the countryside), 
others happen in the invisible space of the market. Workers consciously move 
between different employments as a way to improve their material lives, dropping 
out of waged labour to enter less constraining forms of work. (p. 2) 
Furthermore, citing Qian (2015), Ideho and Taipale (2017), and Ferguson (1999), 
Inverardi-Ferri (2018, p. 3) mentions that mobility as a livelihood strategy is not only a 
strategy for material means but also “exists in connection with everyday practices and 
livelihood strategies that are not engrained in capitalist relations.”  
Mobility typically occurs every day; it also exists in relationship to both capitalist 
and non-capitalist modes of production. Inverardi-Ferri (2018, p. 4), citing D’Andrea 
(2007, p. 27)), states that “their [migrants’] movements are always embedded in social 
networks dictated by rules of reciprocity and solidarity that support their mode of living.” 
Drawing upon Zhang (2001), he characterizes these social networks as resulting from 
sharing a place of origin or being family members with someone. The use of shared space 
in Dongxiaokou hints at the role of social infrastructure in Inverardi-Ferri’s (2018) 
analysis of mobility as a livelihood strategy.  
 Notably, Inverardi-Ferri (2018) notes that Dongxiaokou is heavily influenced by 
the Henan culture (i.e., its dialect, people, and food). He avers that this collective social 
identity is neither static nor immovable, as it has moved around Beijing. Because 
Dongxiaokou’s collective mobility is not place bound, it does not perfectly accord with 
Klinenberg’s (2018) concept of social infrastructure which imagines social infrastructure 
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as bounded. However, Frederiksen (2015) posits that the spatial dynamics of social 
reproduction can change.  
The Henan collective social identity and its role in social reproduction of the 
community are tied to spaces and forms of social infrastructure. Inverardi-Ferri’s (2018) 
description of the role that Henan restaurants and bus lines served in the community is 
related to social infrastructure. Specifically, those restaurants are easy to find, and bus 
lines connect communities in Henan directly to the waste market that is defined, in part, 
by the Henan identity. Though this community is mobile, it is embedded within certain 
forms of social infrastructure that allows the  community to socially reproduce 
themselves. This phenomenon highlights that, even in cities such as Beijing—more likely 
defined by their well-developed service and industrial economies—social infrastructure 
and their embedded socio-spatial practices are important for understanding the livelihood 
strategies of communities.  
3.3 Livelihood Strategies in Lower-Tiered Cities 
 
This thesis’s second research question addresses how the livelihood strategies in 
the peri-urban space of Taiyuan relate to the livelihood strategies in tier-1 cities. To 
enhance contextualization of how unique the livelihood strategies are in Taiyuan’s peri-
urban space as compared to other lower-tiered cities, the thesis explores the livelihood 
strategies in lower-tiered cities. This section on livelihood strategies, following the same 
categorization of livelihood strategies in the previous section, discusses the formal 
economic livelihood strategies, the informal economic livelihood strategies, and the role 
of social infrastructure, social reproduction, and socio-spatial practices.  
3.3.1 Formal Economic Livelihood Strategies 
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To begin the analysis of formal economic livelihood strategies in lower-tiered 
cities, this thesis describes Tian et al.’s (2016) analysis of livelihood strategies in Jiangxi 
province. Their research contributes to filling this gap in China studies while also 
focusing on an underresearched site of urbanization. It uses a livelihood strategies 
framework to analyze the array of jobs that residents of rural and peri-urban spaces 
undertake as urbanization alters their communities. Although most of the residents they 
researched were predominantly in rural areas, some had higher incomes and lived near 
urban centers. Tian et al. (2016, p. 578) note that in China “research on how these social, 
economic, institutional, and geographic factors interact to affect the development of rural 
livelihoods is relatively lacking.” Tian et al. (2016, p. 578) are seemingly researching a 
partly peri-urban space, though they describe the livelihoods as predominantly rural. This 
is because they assert villagers close to urban centers have access to opportunities with 
“high-return[s]” (pp. 581-582).  
Drawing on Ellis (1998), Bebbington (1999), Ulrich et al. (2012), Diniz et  al. 
(2013), Lerner et al. (2013), Tian et al.’s (2016, p. 579) “[l]ivelihood framework takes 
households as basic analysis units to study the well-being of a household” by discussing 
households well-being’s relationship to Bebbington’s (1999) five types of capital (1999). 
Additionally, they write: “Chinese rural households each have a set of feasible livelihood 
options and allocate their labor according to the relative returns of these options in a way 
that increases total income” (Tian et al., 2015, 2016, p.579; Tian, 2011). They reveal that 
individuals achieving the highest incomes owned their own businesses or large-
agricultural land farms or were families that had formally educated migrant workers. 
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Additionally, the proximity of villagers to urban areas was an important determinant for 
having successful livelihoods (Tian et al., 2016): 
[B]eing near urban centers [that] facilitates the development of successful 
diversified livelihoods through combining vegetable cultivation, livestock 
production, and near-home nonfarm work. (p. 583)  
Although their analysis captures much of what constitutes successful rural and peri-urban 
livelihoods, they focus almost exclusively on income accumulation, possibly overlooking 
informal economic strategies and the impacts of social infrastructure and embedded 
socio-spatial practices. As has been discussed in section 3.2.3, livelihood strategies are 
related to much more than income accumulation (e.g. Inverardi-Ferri (2018) places 
importance upon social ties in the success of Dongxiaokou surviving as it moves around 
Beijing).  
 Similarly, Qian and Xue (2017) analyze the effects of small-town urbanization in 
Xi’an. They show that in contrast to tier-1 cities’ peri-urban and urban village residents 
that rent to migrant workers, some peri-urban residents in Xi’an still rely a lot on 
farming.  This diverges from a study in Shenzhen where many former farmers rented to 
migrant workers (c.f., Wang et al., 2009). In the Xi’an case, 25.5% of residents still 
worked in agriculture in town G, 18.4% in town J, and 50.6% in town Z (Qian and Xue, 
2017, p. 155). (Towns G, J, and Z were pseudonyms for towns they researched in Xi’an.) 
Qian and Xue (2017) believe that a large portion of the populations that they studied still 
rely on agriculture, because residents in lower-tiered cities, unlike those in and around 
megacities, can still access areas where agriculture still occurs. This is an important 
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distinction between urbanization occurring in tier-1 cities and in lower-tiered cities, such 
as Xi’an.  
 In another analysis of the effects of resettlement from rural-to-urban settings in 
lower-tiered cities or surrounding areas, Wilmsen (2018) examines the effects of the 
Three Gorges Dam on the resettlement of communities in Hubei province. Unlike many 
rural-to-urban residents in Xi’an who rely on farming, rural-to-urban residents in the 
areas she discusses in Hubei Province relied on manual labor. This concerns Wilmsen 
(2018, pp. 359-360), because data collected in 2003 after resettlement showed rural-to-
urban and urban-to-urban residents were dependent on manual labor at similar rates: 
59.2% for rural-to-urban residents and 46.5% for urban-to-urban residents. However, by 
2011, 40.6% of rural-to-urban residents were still working in manual labor, while only 
10.6% of urban-to-urban residents were employed likewise. Similar to Wang et al.’s 
(2009) study of Shenzhen, Wilmsen (2018) believes that education is the crucial 
difference between jobs accessible to rural-to-urban residents and those available to 
urban-to-urban residents.  
 Verdini’s (2014, p. 425) examination of the social costs in Suzhou’s peri-urban 
space reveals the diverse ways that people make a living; 18.2% work in the primary 
sector, 48.5% in the secondary sector, and 33.3% in the tertiary sector. What 
differentiates Verdini’s study from the livelihood strategies analyses (both in tier-1 and 
lower-tiered cities) is his discussion of home-based enterprises. While cultural capital 
commonly characterizes socio-spatial practices and their embeddedness in social 
infrastructure in this thesis’ use of it, Verdini (2014) connects cultural capital and the 
formal economy in the form of embroidery, a home-based enterprise. 21% of workers 
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worked in home-based enterprises, which Verdini (2014, p. 426) categorized as a 
subsector of the secondary sector. Verdini (2014) commented on the relationship between 
urbanization and the potential loss of a local economic activity, such as home-based 
embroidery. The role of cultural capital in the formal economy is not mentioned in 
chapter 4’s discussion of Taiyuan’s livelihood strategies, but it is an important facet of 
livelihood strategies to consider given place specific forms of cultural capital exist 
everywhere. The different livelihood strategies outlined in this section (Tian et al., 2016; 
Qian and Xue, 2017; Wilmsen, 2018; Verdini, 2014) reveal that there are dissimilarities 
between formal jobs obtainable to residents in megacities and lower-tiered cities, but 
there are also distinctions between and within lower-tiered cities.  
 Another cost of urbanization in the peri-urban spaces is the potential for sub-
standard compensation for residents who are resettled in the peri-urban spaces. This is 
seen in both tier-1 cities (Jiang, et al., 2018) and in lower-tiered cities (Wilmsen, 2018). 
In Wilmsen’s (2018) case study notes that rural-to-urban households earned more in 
compensation that both rural-to-rural and urban-to-urban resettled households. But, this 
larger amount of compensation did not lead to beneficial results, especially amongst the 
rural-to-urban households earning the least amount of compensation. Wilmsen (2018) 
writes:  
These households required more compensation than they received in order to 
adapt to their new environments. Put differently, even over the long term, the 
disadvantages of under-compensation were not fully offset by the benefits of 
living in an urban environment (e.g. greater access to jobs, higher levels of state 
subsidies). Thus, the compensation formulae should be re-evaluated if rural-to-
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urban resettlement is to be favored over land-based compensation in the future. 
(pp. 357-358) 
 The last dynamic that is unique to some provinces with lower-tiered cities is the 
phenomenon of returning migrants to their home provinces from the cities on the coast. 
Xu et al. (2017) researched the circumstances surrounding return migration from 
Shenzhen to Henan, a province in central China. Their case study pertained to Zhumadian 
in Henan. Citing Henan Daily (2014), the researchers (Xu et al., 2017, p. 122) stated that 
they chose Zhumadian because in two years the percentage of rural laborers migrating to 
other cities had been 72%, but only two years later the percentage of rural laborers 
migrating to other cities had decreased to 50%. Xu et al. (2017), referring to Zhang 
(2014), mention that migration from cities such as Shenzhen was resulting from 
industries moving from the coast to inland provinces. In addition to economic 
opportunities, Zhumadian had undergone hukou reforms that have encouraged 
resettlement. The main economic opportunities available to returnees were either factory 
jobs or establishing their own businesses. Zhumadian is an example of the importance of 
paying attention to differences between lower-tiered cities. Residents in inland provinces 
that have been known for sending migrant workers to the coast may use slightly different 
livelihood strategies than provinces that have not been sending many migrant workers to 
the coastal cities. Provinces such as Henan, and specifically in this case Zhumadian, are 
examples of the potential future of urbanization patterns in China (Xu et al., 2017).  
3.3.2 Informal Economic Livelihood Strategies  
A prevalent informal economic livelihood strategy that residents in tier-1 cities 
tend to rely on clearly is renting to migrant workers. However, do lower-tiered peri-urban 
residents depend on renting to migrant workers in the same way residents do in tier-1 
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cities? Lin and Gaubatz (2017) analyze how migrant workers in Wenzhou use space; 
citing Venn (2006), they comment that research on migrant workers’ lives has mostly 
focused on their living situations rather than on other aspects of their lives. In addressing 
this lacuna, Lin and Gaubatz aver that they enhance understanding of the relationship 
between Wenzhou’s economic development and its urbanization built upon migrant 
workers’ coming to the city. Migrant workers comprise 35% of Wenzhou’s population. 
Furthermore, when dividing Wenzhou into its districts, migrant workers “constitute a 
demographic majority in all three of the city’s districts.” (1020). Similar to the argument 
of this thesis that urban studies research in China has been mostly focused on tier-1 cities, 
Lin and Gaubatz (2017) argue that work on migrant workers has mostly focused on 
megacities. A notable difference—already described section 2.2 on informal economic 
strategies in tier-1 cities—between the kinds of labor in which migrant workers engage in 
Wenzhou—predominantly manufacturing —and in megacities—primarily services . Most 
of the migrants’ housing in Shuangyu, the site of the researchers’ analysis in Wenzhou, is 
provided by residents renting homes to them. Although the livelihood strategies 
seemingly are more diverse among residents in lower-tiered cities, leasing to migrant 
workers is still a common informal livelihood strategy among residents in a city such as 
Wenzhou where a large migrant worker population resides. This informal livelihood 
strategy, though not prevalent in lower-tiered cities, seems to be a livelihood strategy 
when the lower-tiered city is home to many migrant workers.  
3.3.3 Social infrastructure, Social Reproduction, and Socio-Spatial Practices  
 
The following section discusses literature that analyzes livelihood strategies and 
prioritizes social infrastructure, social reproduction, and socio-spatial practices, though 
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not using that exact terminology of social infrastructure and socio-spatial practices, in 
Nanjing and Zhenjiang. Tynen (2019) discusses how residents in older Nanjing 
neighborhoods assert their right to the city through social infrastructure and their 
embedded socio-spatial practices. Her argument, citing Degen (2017), He et al. (2017), 
and Meyer (2009) as other noteworthy examples, partly inspired my argument for a 
livelihood strategy analysis that includes social infrastructure, social reproduction, and 
socio-spatial practices benefitting Chinese urban studies by bringing in  “experiences and 
spatial practices” and “holistic and grounded understanding of social and cultural life in 
the city,” for which Tynen (2019, p. 173) calls.  
 Tynen’s (2019) analyzes the experiences of people in urbanizing China from a 
holistic perspective. This thesis’s fieldwork focused on the peri-urban space in Taiyuan, 
as Tynen’s is on the inner-city residents in the old neighborhoods of Nanjing. The 
dynamics she discusses are similar to those in this thesis, such as foreseen demolition of 
homes. Demolitions and “modernization” processes are threatening to destroy the ways 
that local residents claim their right to the city (Tynen, 2019, pp. 178-179): “The 
residents build and maintain relationships as a way to socially and culturally construct 
their neighborhood and assert its value despite the impending demolition.”  
These relationships are based on several key aspects, including “nonmonetary 
exchange of services and shared family histories” as well as the importance of 
individuals’ single-story homes (Tynen, 2019, p.179). The uncommodified exchanges 
include elements of social reproduction. The single-story homes help people share 
different features of social reproduction. Similar to concerns of Smith’s (2014) discussion 
of informal livelihood strategies in Chongqing, modern apartment buildings threaten the 
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social lives of closely-knit neighbors (Tynen, 2019). Although Tynen (2019) does not 
discuss the use of single-story homes as social infrastructure, more traditional Chinese 
homes can serve as social infrastructure by providing a connection between community 
members’ homes and social reproduction.  
Zhang et al. (2018) explore how rural-to-urban residents adapt their use of space 
and their socio-spatial practices when moving from rural communities to cities. Both 
Smith (2014) and Tynen’s (2018) examination of the importance of social lives in 
different aspects of their interviewees’ lives highlighted the tension between 
“modernization” efforts and potential material benefits for rural-to-urban residents and 
the social lives and economic activities that have allowed rural communities to improve 
their lives. Zhang et al. (2018, p. 1542) aver that in some ways their interviewees were 
able to recreate their rural socio-spatial practices in their new urban setting: “We show 
that even under top-down planning, residents are able to continue some forms of 
traditional life-style and refashion their use of space.” They do not draw on the concept of 
social infrastructure, but their use of social space is similar to Klinenberg’s (2018) 
conceptualization of social infrastructure. Zhang et al. (2018, p. 1544), citing Nasongkhla 
and Sintusingha (2013), characterize social space as “where social activities, perceptions 
and constructions are created, contributing significantly to the sense of belonging.” 
The two main methods rural-to-urban residents use to assert their spatial agency 
are (1) adapting their social activities from their courtyard-styled homes to public spaces 
around their apartment buildings and (2) using their homes as a location for businesses 
that can supplement income loss from moving to the city (Zhang et al., 2018). Ultimately, 
Zhang et al.’s (2018) goal, influenced by Spivak (1988) and Herndl and Licona’s (2007) 
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conception of agency, was to understand in what ways rural-to-urban residents are 
reasserting their identities through their use of agency. Residents championing their 
spatial agency were driven by three factors: “[a] quest for economic well-being, desire to 
maintain pertinent traditions, and need for social interactions” (Zhang et al., 2018, p. 
1557). The researchers argue that these factors were founded upon migrants’ habitus, per 
Bourdieu’s (1977, 1989) concept, which can be characterized by the land on which they 
used to live as being central to their livelihood, old familial traditions, and mutually 
beneficial relationships with their neighbors, and Bayat’s (2007, p. 579) habitus of the 
disposed, which Zhang et al. (2018) draw upon to integrate habitus and “a loss of control 
over means of livelihood” (p. 1544).  
They also note that close personal relationships could engender economic success, 
particularly for small businesses in apartment buildings (e.g., erstwhile customers from 
their village doing business with them now). However, Zhang et al. (2018) do not discuss 
many linkages between the economic success of rural-to-urban residents, social space, 
and socio-spatial activities. Arguably, Zhang et al.’s (2018) work augmented 
understanding about the overlap between rural-to-urban residents’ experiences in cities, 
socio-spatial activities, and their use of spaces. Nonetheless, an analysis that uses a 
livelihood strategies framework could add to knowledge concerning how socio-spatial 
practices and social space (social infrastructure, which this thesis uses in its analysis of 
Taiyuan) improve the livelihoods of residents of the community. What efforts residents 
who cannot find work or establish a business in their apartment building take to improve 
their livelihood remains an empirical question. 
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 Similar limitations are found in Wu et al.’s (2019) study of how social 
relationships are reconstituted once residents are resettled in Suzhou. Citing Hoffreth and 
Iceland (2011) and Stumpf (2012), the researchers describe the social relationships in 
rural societies; the relationships tend to be based on kinship, create dependency between 
those involved in social relationships, and promote a “greater sense of responsibility to 
others” (p. 270). They also question some of the economic effects that social 
relationships have on individuals before and after their relocation (e.g., prevalence of 
inter-dependency in rural areas, reduction in financial inter-dependency subsequent to 
relocation). However, Wu et al. (2019) do note that relocated people with beneficial 
economic standing also have an improved social life in terms of seeing relatives. As has 
been shown in this chapter, the connections between livelihood strategies and social 
infrastructure, social reproduction, and socio-spatial practices are strong. However, this 
linkage is examined in greater depth in this thesis than it has been in extant literature 
(e.g., Wu et al., 2019). Accordingly, this begs following question: What has happened to 
those who have had their livelihood strategies and social lives damaged through 
relocation? Although the thesis does not answer this question, it does examine the use of 
homes as social infrastructure and shared public spaces, where an argument is posited 
that social infrastructure and socio-spatial practices play a central role in residents’ 
livelihood strategies.  
3.4 Jinyuan, Taiyuan: A Valuable Case Study for Understanding Urbanization in 
China 
 
3.4.1 Rationale for Selection of Taiyuan as a Case Study 
 
 Not only was Taiyuan chosen a case study because I have experience living there 
in the summer of 2012 for six weeks, but it was also chosen in response to urban 
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scholars’ call for studying new sites of urbanization (Robinson, 2016; Sheppard et al., 
2013). Smith (2014), describing the informal strategies that peri-urban residents use in 
Chongqing, avers: 
 As China embarks on a ‘new form of urbanization,’ the nation’s leaders would be 
wise to explore similar alternatives based on the ways in which China’s people 
actually stitch together their lives. (p. 380) 
He further claims that the Chinese government should learn from research, such as his, 
how to improve the equity of urbanization and that the urbanization process should 
acknowledge the livelihood strategies that people use to support themselves.  
  A key distinction between Smith (2014) and this thesis pertains to the case cities 
selected to represent the new sites of Chinese urbanization. He researched Chongqing, a 
tier-1 provincial-level city in southwest China. However, unlike other tier-1 cities, 
Chongqing is more inland, and not coastal such as Shanghai and Guangzhou (Hernandez 
and Bland, 2016). Furthermore, his analysis focused on hukou reform in Chongqing. 
Hukou reform is occurring in Chongqing; however, under the National New-type 
Urbanization Plan, cities with populations that exceed 5 million people will have tight 
restrictions on people’s attainment of permanent residency. Therefore, Chongqing, as a 
result of its municipality’s population being roughly 31 million people in 2018, will most 
likely not experience dramatic hukou reform (Li et al., 2016, p. 526; Chongqing 
Municipal Statistics Bureau, 2020b). Rather, cities with fewer residents will have the 
more relaxed hukou policies to stimulate further urbanization (Li et al., 2016; Zhang, 
2019). In comparison, Taiyuan has a population below 4 million people (Bureau of 
Statistics of Shanxi Province, 2019). Therefore, cities such as Taiyuan with reduced 
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population counts will be more likely to undertake hukou reforms. These foregoing 
phenomena suggest that future Chinese urban studies research should thus examine cities 
such as Taiyuan.  
 In the 2019 urbanization plan published by the National Development and Reform 
Commission, cities with one to three million residents will remove their restrictions for 
obtaining hukou (Zhang, 2019). Those with populations between three and five million 
will relax restrictions on new migrants and remove limits on key population groups, 
including graduates of universities and vocational colleges (Zhang, 2019). Taiyuan is in 
the latter category. In addition to hukou reforms, the New Urbanization Plan articulates 
other goals, such as promoting regional urbanization coordination and prioritizing 
sustainable urban development (Li et al., 2016). Although Smith’s (2014) analysis of 
welfare and urbanization provides a valuable examination of the local social, political, 
and economic processes that tie a community together, more empirical work is needed in 
case sites and urbanization dynamics that will define China’s urbanization. Taiyuan 
provides this context.  
 However, what part of Taiyuan should be the focus of this thesis initially was 
unclear. Jinyuan seemed to fit the requirements of being a peri-urban space characterized 
by hybrid rural-and-urban institutions, economies, and norms (Smith, 2014). Prior to 
conducting my research, I was unsure about whether Jinyuan would match Smith’s 
(2014) description of hybrid rural-and-urban lives. But upon arrival in Jinyuan, 
confirmation of its being a peri-urban space became clear. Additionally, its features and 
policy goals overlap with China’s New Urbanization Plan. Below is a map of Taiyuan, in 
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which Jinyuan District is highlighted by the green square and the blue square encircles 
Jinyang Lake on the map. 
(Figure 2, Map of Taiyuan, Google, n.d.) 
 
 
Li et al. (2016) emphasize three aspects of the New Urbanization Plan that are 
worth revisiting: policy goals for cities all over China, an emphasis on regional 
urbanization or city clusters, and emphasis on sustainable development in cities.  
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In 2015, a year after the New Urbanization Plan was passed at the national level, Shanxi 
began hukou registration reforms at the provincial level. The relaxation of the hukou 
registration system has seen urban populations grow. For instance, per Liu (2019): “Wo 
sheng chengzhen renkou you 2014 nian de 1192.72 wanren zengjia dao 2018 nian de 
1442.5 wanren, leiji zengjia 250.78 wanren [Our province’s [Shanxi’s] urban population 
from the year 2014 to 2018 increased from 11,927,200 to 14,435,000 people, in total 
increasing by 2,507,800 people].” These numbers are not exclusive to Taiyuan; clearly, 
though, relaxation of hukou policies has led to shifts in the urbanization patterns of 
Shanxi.  
The policy reform provides rural populations easier access to urban hukou and 
facilitates arrival of skilled workers. Moreover, such policy changes fit the goal of the 
Chinese central government: shifting migration patterns to lower-tiered cities by 
encouraging rural migrants and talented individuals to move elsewhere than coastal cities. 
In addition to hukou reform, Jinyuan is also embracing sustainable urban development, 
another goal emphasized by the New Urbanization Plan (Li et al., 2016)).  
 Gao (2018) writes that some of Jinyuan’s broad development goals in 2018 
included: a New-style Urbanization demonstration area, a global tourism district, and 
Jinyang Lake. Jinyang Lake area has been an important development project in the 
district. I was informed that Jinyang Lake used to be the site of a factory. If I had not 
been aware of this situation, my overlooking the remnants of the old factory that had 
stood on the edge of this beautiful, modern park would have been easy. This park is an 
example of the potential Jinyuan has for developing its new cultural tourism and more 
sustainable economy. There are examples of well-established tourist sites in Jinyuan, 
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such as Jinci Park, and ones currently being developed, such as Ancient Jinyang City. As 
discussed, Taiyuan has embraced both the central government’s desire to include  
previously marginalized people into cities and promoted sustainable development. In 
Taiyuan, I was able to simultaneously research in peri-urban space to better understand 
which livelihood strategies people use and witness some urbanization patterns indicative 
of the future of Chinese urbanization.  
3.4.2 An Introduction to Taiyuan’s Economy 
 
Taiyuan is the provincial capital of Shanxi province in China, and a tier-2 city. From 
my first trip to Taiyuan in 2012 to my trip in 2019, the differences between Taiyuan and 
tier-1 cities have begun to lessen. Having spent time in Beijing and Shanghai, the 
economic diversity, abundance of technology and financial firms, and the cities’ scale 
have set tier-1 cities markedly apart from lower-tiered ones.  
 Taiyuan’s economic data relatively parallels those from tier-1 cities presented in 
section 3.2.1. In 2010, Taiyuan’s economy was similar to Chongqing, meaning that the 
secondary and tertiary sectors were more evenly distributed than in some other tier-1 
cities as Shanghai and Beijing. Below Table 6 compares the change in the distribution of 
Taiyuan’s GDP amongst the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors:  
Table 6: The primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors as a percentage of Taiyuan’s GDP 
 2010 2013 2014 2015 
Primary 1.7% 1.5% 1.5% 1.4% 
Secondary 44% 41.7% 39.99% 37.3% 
Tertiary 54.3% 56.8% 58.5% 61.3% 
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In 2010, the primary sector comprised 1.7% of GDP, while the secondary and tertiary 
sectors constituted 44% and 54.3%, respectively. Following a comparable trajectory as 
Tianjin’s during the 2010s, Taiyuan’s service sector as a percentage of GDP has grown, 
the secondary sector has decreased, and the primary sector has remained roughly the 
same. In 2015, the primary sector accounted for 1.4% of GDP; the secondary sector, 
37.3%; and the tertiary sector, 61.3%. Seemingly, the decline in the secondary sector is a 
result of a shrinking of the industry sub-sector. From 2013-2014, the industry sub-sector 
shrank by 2.5% and from 2014-2015 by 1.5%. During those same periods, the building 
industry grew by 1.1% from 2013-2014 and by 5.99% from 2014-2015 (An, 2016, pp. 
472-473).  
 Employment in Taiyuan reflects the economic priorities of Taiyuan. In 2010, the 
primary sector employed 13.8% of the workforce; the secondary sector, 32.3%; and the 
tertiary sector, 53.9%. In 2015, the primary sector comprised 11.3% of the workforce; the 
secondary sector, 29%; and the tertiary sector, 59.6% (An, 2016, p. 472). (The trend of an 
increasing number of people working in the tertiary sector is described in chapter 4 in the 
discussion of livelihood strategies in the peri-urban space of Taiyuan.) Below in Table 7,  
the employment data in Taiyuan is shown from select years in the 2010s:  
Table 7: Percentage of the workforce in Taiyuan’s economic sectors  
 2010 2013 2014 2015 
Primary 13.8% 12.1% 11.3% 11.3% 
Secondary 32.3% 33.8% 31.1% 29.1% 
Tertiary 53.9% 54.1% 57.6% 59.6% 
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Within Taiyuan, the specific district on which this research primarily focused was 
Jinyuan, the southwest district of Taiyuan. In 2011, Jinyuan’s distribution of its GDP 
across economic sectors was not similar to Taiyuan’s (An, 2012, p. 366). However, from 
2013-2015 relative conversion between the two occurred.  
The most noticeable difference occurred between 2013-2015: averaged over the 
same three years, Jinyuan’s primary sector accounted for 7.6% of its GDP compared to 
Taiyuan’s primary sector metric of 1.5% (An, 2014, p. 479; An, 2015, p. 491; An, 2016, 
pp. 472, 496 ). Below, Table 8 shows the percent contribution to Jinyuan’s GDP from 
each sector of its economy: 
Table 8: The primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors as a percentage of Jinyuan’s 
GDP 
 
 2013 2014 2015 
Primary 7.6% 7.7% 7.6% 
Secondary 34.2% 36.1% 37.3% 
Tertiary 58.2% 56.2% 55.1% 
 
Noticeably, agricultural production dominated Jinyuan’s primary sector. On 
average, between 2013-2015, it accounted for 72.2% of the primary sector (An, 2014, p. 
479; An, 2015, p. 491; An, 2016, p. 496). The other large contributor to Jinyuan’s 
primary sector was livestock production. When averaged over 2013-2015, it comprised 
18.6% of their primary sector’s GDP (An, 2014, 2015, 2016). Agricultural products that 
are particularly economically beneficial to Jinyuan are grain, corn, milk, and vegetable 
production (An, 2012. P. 367).  
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This difference between the primary sector as a percentage of GDP in Taiyuan 
and Jinyuan is a result of Jinyuan’s having a lesser percentage of its GDP in secondary 
and tertiary sectors, on average between 2013-2015. Taiyuan’s secondary sector averaged 
39.66% over those three years; its tertiary sector, 58.9% (An, 2016, p. 472). In Jinyuan, 
though, averaged over 2013-2015, the secondary and tertiary sectors constituted 35.9% 
and 56.5% of GDP, respectively (An, 2014, p. 479; An, 2015, p. 491; An, 2016, 496).  
There are two evident limitations in Jinyuan’s economic data. First, the district’s 
economy did not use data from 2012, as there was a glaring mistake and an anomaly. The 
mistake was that the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors’ values exceeded the 
recorded GDP of the district (An, 2013, p. 391). The anomaly was that the data revealed 
livestock production between 2011-2012, a subsector of the primary sector, grew by 
5732.95% and then decreased by 97.7% between 2012-2013 (An, 2012,  p. 366; An, 
2013, 391; An, 2014, p. 479). None of the other years in Jinyuan’s economic data had 
such anomalies. The second weakness was that the employment data in Jinyuan could not 
be used with confidence: inconsistent categories, or records with this type of data, were 
extant. As a result, the employment data could not be compared between Taiyuan at-large 
and Jinyuan. 
However, the economic data clearly revealed that the district significantly relies 
on the tertiary and secondary sectors, but it also has a larger primary sector as a 
percentage of GDP than Taiyuan as a whole. Additionally, when contextualized with my 
interviews, residents depend on primary and tertiary sectors for their livelihoods. How 
much the peri-urban residents in Jinyuan are reliant on the secondary sector is uncertain 
without employment data. Nonetheless, it does represent a large portion of the GDP of 
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the district. How the residents I interviewed fit in with these larger economic trends in 
Jinyuan, and Taiyuan writ large, is discussed in chapter 4. 
3.5 Methodology 
 
My case study site is located in the district of Jinyuan in Taiyuan, China. Prior to 
arriving there, I had minimal preliminary data about the district and/or the city primarily, 
because most of the English-language urban studies research conducted in China is often 
focused on tier-1 cities. Given the Chinese government’s goal to urbanize lower-tiered 
cities, Taiyuan represents a useful case study. Prior to arriving in Taiyuan, I conducted 
preliminary research to decide where within in Taiyuan I would focus my research.  
After perusing descriptions of the six districts of Taiyuan, Jinyuan seemed 
especially appropriate, owing to its proximity to both rural and urban parts of Taiyuan. 
The focus of this thesis is on the peri-urban spaces of cities, as changes that are occurring 
in them as a result of urbanization can be identified. In peri-urban spaces, not only can 
one see the transformation in infrastructure and buildings, but also the mix of the old and 
new economy, the changes in people’s social lives, and the impact of these 
transformations on peri-urban residents.  
Peri-urban space engenders transformations in peoples’ spaces, economies, and 
social lives that seem to be more obscure in urban cores, because of the propensity for 
high-rise buildings, density of businesses, larger population sizes, and denser populations. 
In peri-urban space, becoming cognizant of overlooked aspects within Chinese urban 
studies is possible. He and Qian (2017), citing Hao et al. (2013) and Liu et al. (2015), and 
Logan (2018) implore scholars of Chinese urban studies to focus on the agency that 
individuals use when engaging with larger institutions. Logan (2018) asserts that an 
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increasing number of researchers in Chinese urban studies are challenging the narrative 
of residents in Chinese cities as being passive and unable to affect their future. This thesis 
demonstrates that, by not valuing lower-tiered cities and individual experiences, potential 
nuances and insights may accidentally be ignored.  
I attended a two-month immersion Mandarin Chinese program prior to beginning 
my research. Despite having spent ten years studying Mandarin, the course helped 
strengthen my ability to speak, read, and write Mandarin. However, despite my 
conversational Mandarin being sufficient for my residing in China, my command of the 
precise language needed for conducting field research was lacking. Even having attended 
the IUP Tsinghua University Mandarin Chinese immersion program and being the most 
proficient in Mandarin I had ever been, I still relied upon translators for my interviews. 
Following my immersion program, I spent a month in Taiyuan from mid-August 
to early-September of 2019. During my month in Taiyuan, I was able to spend only three 
days in Nannongcun (a pseudonym for the village where I conducted most of my 
interviews) in Jinyuan. This was a change from my initial plan, which thus required my 
modifying my formally intended methodology. Prior to arriving in China, my plan was to 
spend abundant time in Taiyuan’s peri-urban space. I was hopeful that my research would 
be founded on a non-participant observation methodology. However, upon arrival in 
Nannongcun, I became aware that use of a non-participant observation methodology was 
infeasible: this was largely due to my absence of social connections in the village. 
Consequently, I could only interview the people to whom I was introduced. 
In total, I conducted nine interviews: six interviewees in Nannongcun, where the 
research for this thesis is focused, one professor, and two people from another urban 
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village in a different part of Taiyuan. Interviews lasted on average between ten minutes to 
over two hours, though the interview lasting over two hours was the exception. From 
these semi-structured interviews, I was able to gain an understanding of the economic and 
social changes resulting from Jinyuan’s urbanization and development policies.  
I prepared 56 questions for the interviews4. There were six demographic 
questions, 25 about the economic aspects of the interviewees’ lives, 22 on their social 
lives, and two on interviewees’ reflections vis-à-vis their own lives and the community’s 
economy subsequent to the changes. While I did not ask each question, the questions 
guided me in my interviews. The interviewees ranged in age from early-20s to early-70s. 
The diversity in life experiences gave me insight into how the village has changed over 
the decades. Furthermore, and more pertinent to my research, it allowed me to see how 
the effects of urbanization differentially affected people in dissimilar stages of life.  
  Conceivably, I could have helped my integration in Nannongcun, and potentially 
interviewed more residents, by being formally sponsored by a Chinese university. While 
speaking with a student lecturer from a university in Taiyuan, I later learned that to be 
able to conduct research in China, a formal sponsorship from a Chinese university is 
essential. This would have allowed me to be more easily accepted into the village. As a 
Caucasian American male in peri-urban China, I was starkly different. In fact, when I 
arrived at the offices of the Jinyuan District government and attempted to interview some 
government officials about urbanization in Jinyuan, they mentioned that I was the first 
foreigner who had sought to interview them. The people I spoke to seemed excited to talk 
with me; however, they required approval from city-level government officials. To 
 
4 Please see the appendix for the questionnaire.  
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receive the permission to interview officials, not only would I have needed to speak with 
Taiyuan government officials, but I also would have had to provide them with an official 
letter from the university.5  
The limitations that emerged in the research are mostly the result of three issues: 
an inability to 1) devote sufficient time in the village, 2) spend a long period of time in 
Taiyuan generally, and 3) interview additional people. Notwithstanding these 
weaknesses, I did garner enhanced understanding of the livelihood strategies used in 
Nannongcun. Moreover, based on the results (discussed in chapter 4), further research is 
needed, as some differences between Taiyuan and tier-1 cities were found. As such, 
subsequent research can help validate or add further nuance to the claims in this thesis.  
The findings drawn from my interview data were a culmination of multiple steps. 
The first step was to transcribe my interviews. I relied, in part, on a transcriber who did 
not speak the Shanxi dialect of Mandarin Chinese but was still able to transcribe three 
interviews for me. Additionally, I had one other individual review some of my 
translations; ultimately, however, most interpretations of the data are my own and a result 
of my coding.  
The coding process entailed multiple stages, which were all done manually. The 
first stage was a review of notes and my interviews to identify the most common themes 
related to my thesis topic. The second stage was collecting quotations and notes to isolate 
all pertinent examples.  
 
5 This would have allowed me to not only speak with government officials, but as the professor I 
interviewed mentioned, I could have also been introduced to the heads of the village and the village at-large 
where I hoped to conduct research. 
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In addition to coding my interviews, over the final two weeks I was in Taiyuan, I 
spent considerable time in Taiyuan’s city library seeking potential Chinese sources 
related to urbanization. Sources that were particularly useful were the Taiyuan Yearbooks 
from 2011 to 2017. The information and data in the yearbooks offered insights into the 
economic transformations occurring in Jinyuan and Taiyuan that helped contextualize the 
interviews and data drawn from coding.  
Conclusion  
 
 This chapter initially presented the historical and current patterns of urbanization 
in China. Because a large portion of Chinese urban studies research has occurred in 
prominent Chinese cities, mostly tier-1, this chapter also discussed the livelihood 
strategies commonly found in those types of cities, as well as those in lower-tiered cities. 
This chapter categorized various livelihood strategies as involving formal economic 
activity, informal economic activity, or socio-spatial practices relationships (often 
overlapping with acts of social reproduction) with social infrastructure. This analysis 
revealed that much of China’s urban studies literature overlooks social infrastructure and 
socio-spatial practices embedded within them. In the next chapter, findings from research 
on peri-urban livelihood strategies in Taiyuan, a tier-2 city, will be presented. It will 
document the formal and informal economic practices in Nannongcun, as well as social 
infrastructure and socio-spatial practices, that provide support for the formal and informal 
livelihood strategies. A comparison will also be made between the livelihood strategies in 
Taiyuan and those in this chapter to augment understanding how they are similar and 
different.  
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CHAPTER IV: LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES IN TAIYUAN 
 
Introduction 
 
Analyzing more broadly the relationship between urbanization and livelihood 
strategies is crucial to understand livelihood strategies in Taiyuan and how they compare 
to the livelihood strategies discussed earlier. Chinese urban studies literature has often 
focused on topics such as the effects of the hukou system, and historic urbanization and 
economic development patterns (Chan, 2014; Inverardi-Ferri, 2018; Smith, 2014; Tynen, 
2019). These areas of focus are often viewed from top-down perspectives, but these 
processes also affect individuals’ lives and decisions. Livelihood strategies are a 
combination of decisions that interact directly with urbanization, and in China they are 
diverse. Common livelihood strategies discussed in Chinese urban studies literature 
include rental of peri-urban resident landlords’ extra rooms (Hsing, 2010), illegal or 
informal township urbanization development (Hsing, 2010; Zhao and Zhang, 2016), 
village collective shareholding companies (Hsing, 2010), diversification of agricultural 
and non-agricultural jobs, and informal strategies (Smith, 2014; Tian et al., 2016; 
Inverardi-Ferri, 2018).   
 Formal and informal livelihood strategies do not exist in isolation from each 
other. Livelihood strategies in the peri-urban space in Taiyuan cannot be understood 
outside of the relationships that bind people together and the social infrastructure in 
which these relationships are embedded. The strategies my research uncovered entailed 
formal economic activities (drivers, salespeople, construction workers, tree planters in the 
area’s afforestation efforts, rental of unused agricultural land, reliance on compensation 
from the sale of the village’s land to the government for infrastructure projects, and 
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income from retirement insurance), and informal economic activities (exchanging 
vegetables and other goods, helping with aspects of social reproduction), and reveal how 
social infrastructure and their embedded socio-spatial practices overcome gaps in 
residents’ livelihood strategies. 
 This chapter explores how common livelihood strategies in Chinese urban studies 
literature compare with livelihood strategies identified in Taiyuan. The research questions 
central to the thesis are the following: 1) what are livelihood strategies in Taiyuan’s peri-
urban space? and 2) how do the livelihood strategies found in Taiyuan, a tier-2 city, 
compare to the livelihood strategies found in predominantly tier-1 cities across China? 
Pursuing answers to these questions leads to answers that enhance understanding of 
livelihood strategies in and outside of China and to the ongoing question of whether 
Chinese urban studies can contribute to global urban studies.  
4.1 Formal Economic Livelihood Strategies in Jinyuan 
 
The formal economy has been changing over the past decade across China. These 
changes were discussed in chapter 2. Jinyuan saw its primary sector from 2013-2015, 
when averaged, represent 7.6% of its yearly GDP; the secondary sector, 35.8%; and the 
tertiary sector, 56.5% (An, 2014, p. 479; 2015, 491; 2016, p. 496). These trends in 
Jinyuan’s economy were also evidenced in my interviews.  
The interviewees’ livelihood strategies were changing owing to city- and district-
level economic priorities. The interviewees spoke of increased wages in labor, 
agriculture’s continuing importance, provision of monetary compensation because of 
government conversion of a village’s land into infrastructure projects, and the developing 
cultural and environmental tourism in the district.  
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When reflecting on the changes occurring in Nannongcun that are making 
Taiyuan and Jinyuan increasingly similar, Interviewee 6 said, “They [Taiyuan and 
Jinyuan] have no difference. Especially buying food…the village and the city are the 
same.” For example, the increase in wage labor has been a noticeable transformation in 
Nannongcun’s formal economy. An interviewee mentioned that “now you can earn 
money, go get a waged job; there are many waged jobs here.” The improved economic 
opportunities for residents led to growth in both urban and rural incomes from 2013-2014 
and 2014-2015. Urban income rose 3.2% between 2013 and 2014 and 7.7% from 2014 to 
2015. Meanwhile, rural income grew by 10.5% between 2013-2014 and 7.1% from 2014 
to 2015 (An, 2014, p, 481; An, 2015, p. 493; An, 2016, p. 498). Augmented rural 
incomes during recent years is evident based on my interviews with residents of 
Nannongcun.  
Prevalent wage jobs available to the village now include delivery drivers 
(delivering drinks) or salespeople (selling cars and homes). Unfortunately, I did not get 
additional information regarding how these delivery drivers complement the wider 
economy (e.g., for whom they are delivering drinks). The growth in service jobs is 
reflected in Jinyuan’s tertiary sector: as a percentage of their GDP, they rose from 41.3% 
in 2011 to 55.1% in 2015 (An, 2012, p. 366; 2016, p. 496).  As discussed in the previous 
chapter, specific employment data for Jinyuan District is relatively inaccessible or sparse, 
so detailing the percentage change in employment in the primary, secondary, and tertiary 
sectors cannot be contextualized from government data. However, when I asked “do you 
feel there are job opportunities here?” an interviewee responded that being a kuai di yuan 
(快递员), or express delivery person, is a popular job, as well as is being a salesperson. 
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These positions are available not just in the village, but in neighboring areas (e.g., the city 
center). Interviewee 3 discussed this change: “They [young people] go outside the village 
for work.…they go outside the town, they will earn money…they will go to the city 
center or some other downtown.”  
 The availability of new jobs for Nannongcun residents is coinciding with 
urbanization, thereby creating tighter links between the village and the city. The increase 
in the number of roads and bridges is leading to a closer relationship between the village 
and city and is affecting farms and the availability of farmland. Interviewee 1, in response 
to being asked if many people are still farmers or are instead starting to become drivers or 
salespeople, said, “Fewer people are working in the fields because there are fewer fields. 
The field is becoming the road. The company needs builders to build the road.” 
According to Interviewee 2, although the fields used for growing crops are being 
converted for other uses, raising crops remains the most important part of their economy, 
but mostly it is older residents who farm. To help further contextualize these quotes 
regarding the changing use of land and ongoing urbanization, Figure 3 shows the 
encroaching city from Taiyuan’s urban areas into the peri-urban space of Taiyuan, while 
Figure 4 is an example of crops growing in Jinyuan.  
 How the loss of land for other uses other than farming and the generational divide 
between farmers and wage laborers are affecting the agricultural economy is difficult to 
assess without employment data and the price of goods. However, the loss of agricultural 
land can be derived from government data. Agricultural land between 2013 and 2014 
declined by 6.4% and by 8% between 2014 and 2015. 
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(Figure 3. Urbanization Encroaching Into Jinyuan, Jinyuan. 2019.) 
  
(Figure 4. Plots of Cropland in Jinyuan, Jinyuan. 2019.)
 
 
 
 66 
The biggest change within the broader category of agricultural land was seen in seeded 
crop land, which includes land used to grow corn, wheat, rice, and soybeans. From 2013 
to 2014, the seeded crop land decreased by 8.6% and by 16.4% from 2014 to 2015. This 
differs dramatically from land used to grow vegetables. (Unfortunately, the Taiyuan 
yearbooks did not specify which vegetables were grown on this land.) From 2013 to 
2014, the land used to grow vegetables fell by 3.1% but grew by 3.6% from 2014 to 2015 
(An, 2014, p. 480; An, 2015, p. 492; An, 2016, p. 496-497). Seemingly, then, the 
agricultural economy surrounding vegetable production is becoming a more important 
part of the agricultural economy compared to crops that are produced in much less 
abundance. For example, corn was the predominant cereal crop raised on seeded crop 
land as measured in tons. When averaged between 2013 and 2015, Jinyuan produced 
20,669.4 tons of corn. When averaged over the same period, however, vegetable 
production easily bested its counterpart: 158,844.2 tons of produce (An, 2014, p. 480; 
An, 2015, p. 492; An, 2016, p. 497).                                             
 Agriculture increases income not just through producing cash crops. In fact, 
Interviewee 4 said that he rents his vegetable plot to others as a source of income: “This 
land we rent, one mu is worth 80 kuai during that period of time.”  ¥80 is roughly 
equivalent to $11.27, and a mu (亩) is a Chinese unit of area which is equivalent to .165 
acres, or 2.5% of a square mile.6 In Chinese society, as Interviewee 4 mentioned, land 
plots tend to be much smaller than those in the United States or Canada. He said, “This 
[renting their vegetable plot] is a source of our income.…we want to rent this land [to 
 
6 Unfortunately, I did not obtain information about two important factors that would have allowed me to 
understand in increased detail what percentage of their income came from renting land: the time period that 
rent is due and how many mu of land they rented. 
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whom is not specified], as it gives us non-stop money.” Though ¥80 is not a large sum, it 
does serve a purpose other than being a source of income: it affords those renting their 
land to pursue other jobs. Interviewee 4 confirmed this idea by saying that “I leave to go 
to a part-time job. I work elsewhere. I have no time to farm.”  
As stated earlier by Interviewee 1, the agriculture fields are being replaced by new 
roads. The influx of tertiary sector jobs coincides with the improved infrastructure 
connections between the village and the urban core. Residents welcome these new 
infrastructure projects. During my interviews, residents mentioned numerous times that 
these roads enhance convenience. In addition, those projects provide compensation to the 
villagers, thus increasing their income.  
 There have been two road projects in recent years that have given residents 
monetary compensation. Interviewee 6 said that they received compensation for the first 
road project but not for the second project. Interviewee 6, however, was unconcerned 
about not yet receiving the money. Expropriation of land is common in Jinyuan. The 
district of Jinyuan’s section in the 2016 Taiyuan Yearbook mentions that “[the District of 
Jinyuan] has pushed forward on transforming urban villages; they have demolished 
229.98 ten thousand square meters [or 2,299,800 square meters]” (An, 2016, pg. 463). 
Village residents can still receive compensation money when shares of the village’s land 
is sold. Though Interviewee 6 seemed pleased with her compensation for the first road, 
Jiang et al. (2018) and Wilmsen’s (2018) studies of peri-urban residents’ receipt of 
compensation for their land and assets hints that the expropriation process in China is 
problematic (as was discussed here in chapter 3).  
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 As Jinyuan continues to expand its cultural and environmental tourism, how 
individuals and communities will fit into Jinyuan’s changing economic patterns is 
difficult to determine. Interviewee 4 described the expansion of this part of the district’s 
economy: “Here, [Nannongcun] until Jinyang Lake, this large area all belonged to a 
tourist district.” In my interview with Interviewee 4, he mentioned several cultural sites: 
Jinyang Lake, the ancient city in Jinyang, and the large bridge project (whose nickname 
is “the internet-famous bridge” near Nannongcun). From my interviews and my 
experiences visiting several tourist sites, beyond the increase in the number of service 
jobs, a significant part of the continued growth of Jinyuan’s tertiary sector lies in tourism. 
What Jinyuan’s emphasis on the tourist economy means for individuals’ and rural 
communities’ livelihoods is an unknown, however, as these projects are relatively recent 
and ongoing, such as Jinyang Lake park. These different facets of Jinyuan’s current and 
future economy are vital in understanding the livelihood strategies that are used in the 
area. They must, however, be understood in relation to the informal aspects of Jinyuan’s 
economy as well. Below, I tried to capture the scale of the Jinyang Lake project described 
by Interviewee 4 in Figure 3. 
(Figure 5. Jinyang Lake, Jinyuan. 2019) 
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The formal economy predominantly spans the secondary and tertiary sectors, as 
has been described in chapter 3 and here. However, Jinyuan’s primary sector, especially 
agriculture, remains an important part of the economy.The economic changes have been 
beneficial for the community. Indeed, the material conditions of the village have 
improved dramatically. Interviewee 6 said, “Now life conditions are very good. The 
economy is not just this field. Material conditions are getting increasingly better.” The 
economic, social, and infrastructural changes improved their material conditions.  
4.2  Informal Economic Practices of Nannongcun  
 
  While the foregoing section analyzed the formal economic strategies residents in 
Taiyuan’s peri-urban space use, an analysis of livelihoods, though, must include the 
informal economy as well. Although the formal economic practices described by 
interviewees were similar to some of the tier-1 and other lower-tiered cities in chapter 2, 
the informal livelihood strategies did reveal divergence between how prevalent renting to 
migrant workers is in cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and other tier-1 cities, and in 
Taiyuan. 
There are some commonalities between the informal livelihood strategies in both 
tier-1 and lower-tiered cities discussed earlier and those described to me in Nannongcun. 
For example, informal livelihood strategies in Nannongcun are not characterized by 
exchange of money. Instead, informal livelihood strategies are a means of supporting 
oneself and neighbors through an exchange of goods. (This relates to the concept of the 
moral economy discussed in chapter 2.) The informal economy in Nannongcun is built on 
close relationships with community members. Sharing vegetables and other items was 
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mentioned by multiple interviewees. Interviewee 4, for instance, articulated the 
following:  
Other people grow vegetables; next to our house, our neighbor grows many 
vegetables, many other people give to me….vegetables, some stuff, only for 
especially valuable stuff do you give money.   
The moral economy is characterized by both mundane acts, such as the ones noted 
by Interviewee 4, and its role in helping neighbors in times of hardship. When I asked 
Interviewee 5 in what ways she and her neighbors help each other, she responded, “We 
all help, we all help each other.…if the land has little life, we will help. Whoever’s family 
has stuff, they will go help.” Such behavior is common in Nannongcun. Sharing food is 
helpful in a community that still relies on agriculture not only as a source of income, but 
also as a source for food. Interviewee 5 mentioned that a member of the community 
would help someone if his/her/their vegetables were not ripe, but his/her/their own 
produce was.  
The sharing of goods is one illustration of the informal economy’s providing 
stability in a community where residents’ livelihoods are diverse and not always reliable. 
The concept of a moral economy is not specific to China, yet the cultural norms 
surrounding exchanges within its moral economy—as exemplified by the experience in 
Nannongcun—have particular importance. Protecting one’s pride and other people’s 
pride is a large part of how the moral economy operates in Nannongcun. As Interviewee 
4 said:  
Our neighbors will not accept money, even if you pay; face-to-face you can only 
use this method [giving gifts, or items, rather than money]. Other people give 
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chicken. Inside your home, you give other people alcohol; the person who gave 
will receive some alcohol, mutual exchange. The circumstances asking for money 
are few; wanting to ask for money is a special circumstance. 
Highlighting how cultural norms and behavior help regulate the moral economy in 
Nannongcun is important. The importance of the moral economy relates to the social 
reproduction of the community, as it helps community members meet their needs—such 
as having a sufficient food supply—which enables their community to reproduce itself. 
Social reproduction allows capitalist production to perpetuate itself.  
This thesis sheds light on aspects of social reproduction on which Frederiksen 
(2015, p. 143) focused: “the work of care, socialization, and the fulfillment of human 
needs that stem from basic survival and human biological reproduction.” Activities 
supporting laborers’ ability to contribute to capitalist production, such as cooking and 
teaching, are within the realm of social reproduction. Interviewee 5 described work she 
does that would be considered social reproduction: “I clean pots, cook food, wash 
clothes.…I am a good wife and loving mother [the common idiom xianqi 
liangmu(贤妻良母)].” An additional example of community members assisting through 
social reproduction, mentioned to me,  was helping to raise children. Similar forms of 
informal economic practices, both vis-à-vis a moral economy and acts of social 
reproduction, are discussed by both Smith (2014) and Tynen (2019). The informal 
livelihood strategies in Nannongcun were different from those observed in research on 
tier-1 Chinese cities; the difference is most clearly in the absence of community members 
reliance on renting rooms to migrant workers. 
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 This potential difference is worth noting. As was described in Hsing (2010) and 
Wu (2016b), renting rooms to migrant workers is common in eastern cities that have been 
the foundation of China’s rapid economic growth. Because of a lack of data, whether 
renting to migrant workers is uncommon in Nannongcun, or more broadly in Taiyuan, 
cannot be unequivocally asserted. Conceivably, however, unlike tier-1 Chinese cities that 
attract millions of migrant workers, renting to migrant workers in Taiyuan is not a 
livelihood strategy that a majority of residents employ. 
 My impression gleaned from my interview with Interviewee 5 was that renting to 
migrant workers was not prevalent. When asked if many people in the village rent their 
house, she estimated that “out of about 100 households, about 20 households do.” 
Following that, she reduced her estimate to “about 10% of the village’s households”—
again reflective of a small percentage. When I asked Interviewee 2 if people rented their 
homes to migrant workers, he responded with an unconvincing affirmative. Without 
statistics regarding the number of migrant workers living in the village and the attendant 
number of households renting to migrant workers, concluding that the village is not 
renting to migrant workers is questionable. However, when I raised this issue and 
specifically discussed migration patterns in China with Interviewee 7, a student lecturer 
at a university in Taiyuan, she provided some clarity. She felt that migrant workers will 
continue to relocate to tier-1 cities because tier-1 cities, like Beijing and Shanghai, are 
viewed as the hubs of China’s economy.  
There are well-known neighborhoods in cities such as Beijing where migrant 
workers live. Inverardi-Ferri’s (2018) article on the neighborhood Dongxiaokou is one 
example of a neighborhood predominantly composed of migrant workers. Seemingly, a 
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neighborhood such as this would exist in Taiyuan if there were many migrant workers in 
it. Therefore, I asked the professor months later whether there are well-known 
neighborhoods in Taiyuan where migrant workers live. She responded that earlier there 
were some urban villages where many migrant workers resided. However, the city has 
transformed, so migrant workers dispersed throughout the city, with some even returning 
to their hometowns. Currently there does not seem to be a neighborhood in Taiyuan that 
is known as a community where migrant workers live.  
A news feature compiled stories about the transformation that has occurred in 
Taiyuan since 2015. It wrote that in 2015, Taiyuan hoped to raze and modify 85 villages 
in the city; by 2020, 170 villages (Taiyuan Chengzhongcun Gaizao [Transforming 
Taiyuan’s Urban Villages], n.d.). Accordingly, apparently there was an effort by the 
Taiyuan government to alter many urban villages, which may have led to the migrant 
workers’ dispersion mentioned by the professor. This phenomenon may explain why 
renting to migrant workers currently is not a common livelihood strategy among peri-
urban residents and why the urban villages were not initially populated by a high 
percentage of migrant workers.  
Additionally, I followed up with a contact in Taiyuan who sought to discern 
whether anyone knew of a particular part of Taiyuan where migrant workers lived. The 
informed me that no one knew of such a neighborhood. Given the research on urban 
villages and migrant workers in tier-1 cities, I believe that the current livelihoods of peri-
urban residents do not rely on renting to migrant workers at the same levels as seen in 
cities such as Beijing Shanghai, and Guangzhou. Whether this would hold true in the 
period before Taiyuan’s effort to demolish and transform villages in the cities is 
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uncertain. Nonetheless, the question arises about where the migrant workers went, if they 
are indeed not in Taiyuan. An attendant query pertains to whether the towns and cities in 
Shanxi that are re-absorbing the migrant workers returning home are urbanizing.  
 The foregoing informal economic activities show that Nannongcun relies on a 
moral economy. The exchanges that occur within the moral economy described in my 
interviews span from sharing vegetables with neighbors to helping one another overcome 
periods of food insecurity to assisting neighbors with various aspects of their social 
reproduction. Informal economic activities in Nannongcun coexist alongside the formal 
economic activities previously described.  
4.3 Social Infrastructure, Social Reproduction, and Socio-spatial Practices in 
Nannongcun 
 
 The following section describes how social infrastructure, and embedded socio-
spatial practices, play additional and significant roles in the success of livelihood 
strategies in the community. Social infrastructure and its embedded socio-spatial 
practices have economic value for the residents I interviewed. There were numerous 
social activities that would not commonly be classified as either formal or informal 
economic activities. During my interviews, no one mentioned that the daily social 
activities they undertook with neighbors were used to improve their economic standing. 
However, particularly when reviewing informal economic activities, social relationships 
between community members were clearly essential for their livelihood strategies.  
Social relationships between community members are produced through the 
social lives in their homes, activities such as playing majiang and dancing, helping 
neighbors with common and important events in their life (e.g., wedding, funeral), and 
spending time at the “internet-famous bridge.” Residents’ use of social infrastructure is 
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intimately linked with some social activities. The social infrastructure in the community 
can both promote and inhibit these socio-spatial practices.  
 Urbanization is changing the landscape of the village. Formal economic activities 
described earlier have benefitted from the improved infrastructure connecting the village 
to Taiyuan’s urban core. When I asked Interviewee 2 how he felt about the changes 
coming from urbanization and why, he responded, “Very good.…because it is 
convenient.” This sentiment was echoed by Interviewee 3, “Life is much better. It is more 
convenient. The traffic is better.” The improved roads and the bridge are welcomed by 
residents because they have improved the connections between the village and other parts 
of Taiyuan. Not only has travel been made easier, but the infrastructure projects seem to 
be contributing to the enhanced material conditions and access to goods. Although there 
was some difference between the material conditions in the village compared to the urban 
core, Interviewee 2 was discomfited when I asked him to describe the relationship 
between the village and Taiyuan. He said that he did not believe that Nannongcun and 
Taiyuan were separate places. In fact, he averred that “I am in Taiyuan city, so it is more 
convenient.” Clearly there are some positive feelings regarding urbanization, but they are 
not universal. Interviewees mentioned the benefits of urbanization, but some worried 
about the effects that the changing landscape would have on their social lives.  
 The integration of the village into the urban core through infrastructure projects 
has caused residents to be concerned that their homes will be demolished in the near 
future. Interviewee 6, when discussing this possibility, said that residents are 
apprehensive but are not certain when their homes will be demolished. In response to a 
follow-up question about how interviewees felt that their homes will be demolished, 
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Interviewee 6 said, “[I] listen to people and guess, because [it’s because] of the bridge.” 
The bridge, at the time of my research, was close to the village and was near completion. 
The main structure that connects the opposing banks of the Fenhe river was complete. 
When I visited the site, the rest of the bridge project was blocked by a temporary brick 
wall. Residents are worried about moving from their community. Although material 
conditions are improving, urbanization could have inimical effects on their social lives.  
 Interviewee 6, who said there are no differences between Nannongcun and the 
urban center, did, though, subsequently note one significant dissimilarity: “The most 
important difference is we do not live in apartment buildings; instead we live in single-
story homes.”  Residents throughout the town almost had the same yellow brick single-
story home with large heavy doors that formerly opened into a courtyard. This style of 
architecture was mentioned more than once as being important to residents. It allowed 
their social lives to flourish. Later in the interview, Interviewee 6 said, “I am afraid of 
living in an apartment building.…I cannot talk with all the neighbors.”  In a discussion 
with Interviewee 6 about moving to modern apartment buildings, she mentioned is the 
importance of having neighbors visiting: ”People arrive in our home and we are together; 
together we play majiang.” Here is an example of a nearby apartment building with 
security (e.g. note the security gate at the entrance) in Figure 6, which contrasts the style 
and lack of visible security seen in more traditional rural homes, seen in Figure 7:  
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(Figure 6. Peri-urban Apartment Building, Jinyuan. 2019.) 
  
(Figure 7. Rural Home in the Countryside, Jinyuan. 2019.) 
 
In the much broader context of China, homes in less urbanized spaces serve as 
important pieces of social infrastructure. The residents worry that their homes that have 
promoted closeness between neighbors will be lost when they move into an urban 
 
 78 
landscape. Modern apartment buildings in China, similar to those in the United States, 
have security systems and are occasionally gated. Interviewee 1 echoed this situation:  
I feel it is inconvenient [living in an apartment building]. I am not sure, but then I 
think maybe it will be inconvenient to visit friends because now the house is 
open, and it is convenient to go into, but in the apartment building it is not 
convenient.   
Residents fear that they might lose the close-knit community that is produced, in part, by 
their single-story, inviting homes. The intimate social relationships that tie this 
community together were revealed by Interviewee 4:  
Early I thought about going to the city. I don’t want to go to an apartment 
building anymore.…buying an apartment, at that time was cheap, but I didn’t 
want to go; I have many friends.  
However, rural-to-urban residents in China do not axiomatically lose their social 
networks. As discussed in chapter 3, residents in Zhenjiang, unable to use their homes for 
such social activities such as poker, used communal space around the apartment buildings 
to maintain their close social relations with long-time community neighbors (Zhang et al., 
2018). Interviewee 8, who lived in an urban village elsewhere in Taiyuan, felt their social 
lives had not changed when she moved into a new apartment from her village. 
 Not all socio-spatial practices that tie community members together occur within 
their homes. When visiting China, one of the initial cultural differences that may be 
noticeable to a foreigner is when community members in large groups in the mornings 
and evenings are exercising, playing cards, or dancing. This is a common social practice, 
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and one that is important to those I interviewed. When I asked Interviewee 3 what the 
most important social activity is, she responded as follows: 
Model show. In the countryside the women have beautiful clothes and show them. 
It will make them feel happy. [Also,] dancing, playing ping-pong, and the model 
show…they have a team for drums.  
These types of group activities were also discussed by interviewee 4:  
In the early morning, every day we go behind this small building; it has village 
exercise equipment, and it has ping-pong. In the evening, if it is not too hot, and 
we cannot fall asleep, we go to the bridge, dance, beat drums, walk. It is very 
good. In the village, from young to old, [they] say that this life is convenient. 
Inside the city, it is not convenient, living in one danwei building, we do not have 
the same warmth.   
The public spaces in which these socio-spatial practices occur are critical pieces of the 
social infrastructure. The shared space where people play ping-pong, for example, 
promotes social bonds among community members.  
Another example again illustrates the strong relationship between social 
infrastructure and the socio-spatial practices of the residents of Nannongcun. The new 
“internet-famous bridge” near the village—presumably earning that name from people 
sharing photos of it on the internet because of its beautiful modern design—
simultaneously evokes emotions of excitement and worry. As discussed earlier, residents 
are concerned that their homes will be demolished fairly soon owing to the encroaching 
bridge project. Nonetheless, the bridge serves as a source of pride. Interviewee 4 spoke 
glowingly about the new importance that the “internet-famous” bridge has in the socio-
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spatial practices of residents in Nannongcun: “When the evenings are cool, some women 
will take photos at the bridge…They will smile and take photos.”.  
The descriptions of how residents use social infrastructure, and the socio-spatial 
practices embedded within them, demonstrate how utilization of social infrastructure (in 
this case homes, bridges, and shared exercise spaces) promotes close attachments within 
the community. The discussion on the moral economy and social reproduction in section 
4.2 on the informal economic practices in Nannongcun illustrates the significance of 
strong social bonds that allow the community’s livelihoods to flourish. Non-commodified 
aspects of peoples’ livelihoods (social infrastructure and socio-spatial strategies) are often 
not emphasized in a livelihood strategy analysis in China to the same degree as the 
formal wage labor is. However, as has been shown in this chapter’s analysis of livelihood 
strategies in Jinyuan, they deserve increased recognition in the analyses of livelihoods.   
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter began by asking two research questions: 
1) What are the livelihood strategies employed in Taiyuan? 
2) How do the livelihood strategies employed in Taiyuan differ from those found in tier-1 
cities  in China? 
These questions sought to enhance understanding of the livelihood strategies in the peri-
urban space of Taiyuan and compare those findings to prevalent livelihood strategies 
found in Chinese urban studies literature. The answer to the first question is that the 
livelihood strategies in Nannongcun and Jinyuan are diverse. They are a combination of 
formal and informal economic practices that are built on the social relationships that 
create strong bonds between community members. The formal economic activities fall 
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within the tertiary sector, such as being a delivery driver or a salesperson, and the 
primary sector, such as agriculture. Informal economic activity in Nannongcun was 
commonly an extension of the community’s formal agricultural economy in the form of 
their moral economy. Within the moral economy, residents often exchanged goods such 
as vegetables when their neighbors’ vegetables were not ripe, rather than conduct a 
monetary transaction. The informal economy also included aspects of social 
reproduction, such as familial work or assistance with childcare among families. 
In addition to these economic activities, the social infrastructure and socio-spatial 
practices are vital to the community’s livelihood strategies. Social infrastructure and 
socio-spatial practices contribute to maintaining close relationships that help community 
members, especially in sustaining the community’s moral economy. The social activities 
included visiting friends in their homes, playing majiang, participating in ping-pong, 
dancing, exercising together, and going to the new bridge to socialize. Interviewees 
repeatedly mentioned the importance that social infrastructure has in their social lives. As 
these peri-urban areas’ physical landscapes change, so might the social lives of 
community members. Multiple interviewees expressed concern about this prospect. In 
particular, they worried about their social lives deteriorating as a result of living in 
modern high-rise buildings.  
Ultimately, the answer to the second question (differences between Taiyuan and 
tier-1 cities) is that the livelihood strategies in Taiyuan, when compared to those 
documented in more prominent Chinese cities, were found to be similar, but a bit 
different. For example, the striking dissimilarity is between the proportion of residents in 
peri-urban and urban village areas in tier-1 cities renting to migrant workers and the 
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number of peri-urban residents leasing to migrant workers in Taiyuan. Because of these 
slight differences, they beg the following question: what will urbanization look like in 
lower-tiered cities as compared to the patterns of urbanization in the well-known coastal 
cities? The concluding chapter discusses where Chinese urban studies can go from here 
using a comparative urbanism approach and how it can adapt to the changing patterns of 
urbanization in China.  
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CONCLUSION: HOW A COMPARATIVE URBANISM AND LIVELIHOOD 
STRATEGIES APPROACH CAN CONTRIBUTE TO CHINESE URBAN 
STUDIES 
 
This concluding chapter will answer the question that brought the discussion of 
livelihood strategies to a close in chapter 4. Given individuals in tier-1 and lower-tiered 
cities do employ different livelihoods strategies to some extent and the central 
government hopes to promote urbanization in lower-tiered cities, researchers must 
analyze how individuals are faring in underresearched areas of China. To answer how 
urbanization will occur in lower-tiered compared to tier-1 cities, scholars should draw on 
Robinson’s (2016) comparative urbanism framework discussed in chapter 2. The essence 
of this framework is that urban studies has been dominated by narratives and theories that 
have ignored research from underrepresented parts of the world within western academia. 
An increased understanding of how urbanization is occurring can be revealed through 
researching cities such as Taiyuan. Cities that are understudied contain historical 
processes that can all equally be a part of global urban studies (Robinson, 2016). The 
research herein is particularly relevant for future efforts for two primary reasons. First, 
the livelihood strategies in Taiyuan, and other lower-tiered cities, are diverse. Second, an 
important issue is related to how different communities’ use of social infrastructure, and 
their embedded socio-spatial practices, change as a result of urbanization, and how this in 
turn affects their livelihood strategies. 
The livelihood strategies that were discussed in chapter 4 did not differ 
dramatically from research in other lower-tiered cities (Huang et al., 2017; Wilmsen, 
2018). However, there were noticeable differences between tier-1 cities, and Wenzhou, 
another lower-tiered city (Hsing, 2010; Lin and Gaubatz, 2017; Wu, 2016b). Both tier-1 
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cities’ and Wenzhou’s populations consist of a large portion of migrant workers. As 
noted in the literature, migrant workers tend to live in neighborhoods together where the 
rent is inexpensive (Lin and Gaubatz, 2017). As a result, many residents residing in their 
peri-urban or urban villages can rely on renting to migrant workers to make a living 
(Hsing, 2010; Wu, 2016b). Taiyuan is an example of a city where seemingly a large 
portion of the population does not rent to migrant workers.  
As Wilmsen (2018) mentioned, residents moving from rural-to-urban 
communities as a result of urbanization fared markedly worse vis-a-vis their material 
conditions than individuals engaged in urban-to-urban movement. Wilmsen (2018) noted 
this is probably a function of insufficient formal education, which inhibits rural-to-urban 
residents from acquiring adequate jobs. More research in Taiyuan, and other lower-tiered 
cities, where peri-urban residents are not relying on renting to migrant workers is needed. 
If rural-to-urban residents are struggling in situations where they must compete in an 
urban job market, and cannot rely on leasing to migrant workers, the question arises 
regarding how these residents survive and what role do social infrastructure and their 
embedded socio-spatial practices have in peoples’ livelihoods where their livelihoods are 
precarious.  
My research in Nannongcun demonstrates that peri-urban communities, who have 
yet to be absorbed completely into the urban job market, derive economic benefits from 
their social infrastructure and socio-spatial practices, which support livelihoods when 
there are income gaps. Admittedly, social networks are not universally dissolved in 
urbanized areas, as described by Interviewee 8 who lived in an urban village in another 
part of Taiyuan. Additionally, Zhang et al. (2018) depict how residents adapted their 
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social networks to maintain their socio-spatial practices in modern apartment buildings 
and how some used their new apartment as a home for their small businesses that relied 
on social networks from their erstwhile village for their customer base. However, there is 
also research that describes rural-to-urban residents struggling in the city, such as 
Wilmsen’s (2018) analysis of rural-to-urban residents in Hubei province. Future work 
could focus on enhancing understanding of how rural-to-urban residents’ social 
infrastructure and socio-spatial practices change in the city. Additionally, that research 
should examine the linkages between rural-to-urban residents’ livelihoods and their social 
infrastructure and embedded socio-spatial practices. 
 The concept of social infrastructure is an example of how Chinese urban studies 
can contribute to and be enriched by urban studies elsewhere. As discussed in chapter 2, 
Chinese urban studies as a body of literature is still grappling with how it can contribute 
to global urban studies. This thesis’ analysis of livelihood strategies in tier-1 and other 
lower-tiered cities has shown that the experiences within underresearched cities can begin 
to problematize the frameworks that shape the dominant understandings of urban studies 
in China. By emphasizing the importance of the co-constitutive relationship between 
socio-spatial practices and social infrastructure in livelihood strategies, analyses of 
livelihood strategies in China can be better informed.  
 Similarly, Chinese urban studies can contribute to urban studies around the globe 
by centering livelihood strategies as the analysis. Future Chinese urban studies research 
can be in dialogue with research from other parts of the world that focus on the 
importance of social infrastructure, social-reproduction, and socio-spatial practices in 
livelihood strategies. Inspired by a comparative urbanism framework, by centering 
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processes such as the one described herein, both Chinese and global urban studies can 
develop augmented understandings of how urbanization operates around the globe, 
thereby generating knowledge of how urbanization is simultaneously a shared and 
individualized experience.  
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APPENDIX 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
1. Demographics: 
 
1.1 What is your age?  
1.2 How many family members do you have?  
1.3 Do they live in your town?  
1.4 What level of education do you have? 
1.5 Are you originally from this town? If no, where? 
 
2.  Economic questions:  
 
2.1 How do you support yourself?  
2.2 How many days a week do you work?  
2.3 How many hours per day do you work?  
2.4 Do a lot of people from your community work here? If not, where?  
2.5 What jobs are available in your community?  
2.6 Do most people work in their own business or enterprise or for another company?  
2.7 If you needed money to support yourself, who would you be able to ask for help?  
2.8 If you could change your community’s economy what would you change?  
2.9 Has your income risen in in the past years?  
2.10 How do you see the economy of your area changing?  
2.11 Do you rely on cash or WeChat or another electronic payment service? 
2.12 Have you thought about renting your apartment to migrant worker(s)? 
2.13 Do you rent your house? If so, to who?  
2.14 Is it common for homes to be rented as a way to earn money? 
2.15 What is the value of your land? 
2.16 Have you planned or plan to sell your land?  
2.17 What role do you have in the local economy? 
2.18 What is the most important part of your economy?  
2.19 Do you have multiple jobs? 
2.20 Does your spouse work? 
2.21 Do you support your in-laws? 
2.22 If so, do they look after your children? 
2.23 Are businesses in your community owned by locals? 
2.24 Has there been foreign investment in your community?  
2.25 Do you work with other members of your community?  
 
3.  Social questions:  
 
3.1 How many people are in your family?  
3.2 How many of those do you support?  
3.3 What educational opportunities are there?  
3.4 Do many kids in your community go to high school?   
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3.5 Do many kids in your community go to college?  
3.6 Do you have access to social services?  
3.7 If so, which social services? 
3.8 Do many citizens in your area change their hukou?  
3.9 Do many citizens give up their rural hukou for an urban hukou? 
3.10 Do you buy your food?  
3.11 Do your community members rely on food they grow or the market?  
3.12 How often do you spend time with people in your community outside of your 
family?   
3.13 If you could change your relationship with your neighbor’s and/or family, how 
would you?  
3.14 Do you think you live in a rural area, city or peri-urban area?  
3.15 Do you feel connected to Taiyuan? If so, how are you connected to Taiyuan? 
3.16 What communities do you conduct business with? 
3.17 Do you consider moving away from your home? 
3.18 What role do you have in the local social life? 
3.19 What is your daily schedule? 
3.20 Has your community become more urban in the last 5, 10, 20 years? 
3.21 Do you feel a part of the city or the rural community?  
3.22 Why do you live here?  
3.23 What is special about your community? 
3.24 Are there plans to urbanize your community? 
 
4.  Historical questions:  
 
4.1 Has your community’s economy changed in the past 5, 10, 20 years? If so, how 
so?  
4.2 How has your individual life changed in the past 5, 10, 20 years? If so, how so?   
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